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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EFFECTS OF A DRAMA-BASED LANGUAGE INTERVENTION ON  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY OF MIND AND EXECUTIVE  
FUNCTION IN URBAN KINDERGARTEN STUDENTS 
by 
Heather Smith 
 
Because theory of mind (ToM; Samson, 2009) and executive function (EF; 
Meltzer, 2010) are important skill domains for children‟s academic and social success in 
school, researchers have focused on evaluating the impact of interventions designed to 
enhance the development of these skills (e.g., Peskin & Astington, 2004; Dowsett & 
Livesey, 2000). Using an experimental design, the current study evaluated the 
effectiveness of the Georgia Wolftrap (GWT) program, a drama-based language 
intervention, at improving ToM and EF in a sample of kindergarten students from low 
socioeconomic (SES) backgrounds. Researchers (Cole & Mitchell, 1998; Noble, Norman, 
& Farah, 2005) have indicated that low SES is associated with underdeveloped ToM and 
EF. Thirteen lessons designed to enhance children‟s understanding and use of symbols by 
exploring literature through imaginative role-play were implemented in place of the 
regular language arts curriculum. This intervention was hypothesized to engender growth 
in ToM because it incorporates elements found to be associated with ToM development, 
such as experience with language (e.g., Jenkins & Astington, 1996), mental state talk 
(e.g., Adrian, Clemente, & Villanueva, 2007), and pretend play (e.g., Cutting & Dunn, 
2006). The impact on EF development, particularly inhibition and attentional control, was 
expected to be caused by children‟s participation in intervention activities that require 
sustained, active engagement and use of motor and cognitive self-control. Consistent with 
research describing early childhood as a period of dramatic growth in ToM and EF (e.g., 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), the results of paired-sample t tests indicated that the 
intervention (n = 41) and control groups (n = 42) demonstrated significant improvement 
in ToM, inhibition, and attentional control from pre-test to post-test. Despite a trend for 
the intervention group to demonstrate stronger performance, analyses of covariance 
(ANCOVAs) indicated that, after controlling for pre-test scores, there were no significant 
differences in post-test scores between the intervention and control groups. Possible 
explanations for the lack of significant differences between the intervention and control 
groups are discussed. Implications for future research are also suggested.   
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v 
THEORY OF MIND STRATEGIES FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATORS 
 
In virtually all preschool and elementary classrooms, there is at least one child 
who has difficulty interacting with others in a positive and appropriate social manner. 
This child may struggle to function independently in social situations and may become 
argumentative or withdrawn in response to difficult or unsuccessful interactions with 
peers. He or she may appear to be uncooperative or to have difficulty understanding 
things from another‟s point of view. The child‟s problems with perspective-taking may 
also hinder his or her ability to understand a character‟s or author‟s point of view in a 
story; thus, he or she may not fully comprehend what is read. When determining how to 
explain and intervene upon this child‟s social and academic difficulty, educators should 
consider directing their attention to theory of mind.   
Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) is a broad term for social 
cognitive skills involving the ability to attribute mental states (e.g., desires, beliefs, 
feelings, intentions) to oneself and to other people (Lang & Perner, 2002; Sodian, 2005). 
These skills guide many social interactions and allow an individual to predict, explain, 
and manipulate others‟ behavior as well as modify his or her own behavior as necessary 
(Doherty, 2009; Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002). More specifically, ToM abilities are 
used to acknowledge and evaluate multiple viewpoints and to make causal links between 
others‟ mental states and behaviors (in past, present, and future circumstances). 
Individuals then use this information to adjust their own behavior accordingly in order to,  
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for example, avoid conflict or attain a desired outcome (Samson, 2009; Watson, Nixon, 
Wilson, & Capage, 1999).  
Children‟s ability to understand their own and others‟ thinking and behavior is a 
critical part of their academic success in school as well (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; 
Klein, 1998; Pelletier & Astington, 2004). First and foremost, in order for students to 
benefit from instruction, they must have sufficient ToM development to recognize the 
teacher‟s intention to increase their knowledge or understanding (Tomasello, Kruger, & 
Ratner, 1993; Ziv, Solomon, & Frye, 2008). As children engage in academic learning, 
they use ToM abilities to identify gaps or errors in their own knowledge and recognize 
differences in their knowledge compared to the knowledge held by others (Miller, 2000; 
Ziv & Frye, 2004). Furthermore, with regard to reading achievement, ToM skills are 
integral to children‟s ability to experience a deeper level of comprehension by integrating 
story characters‟ mental states and actions (Pelletier & Astington, 2004).  
ToM has been the subject of much theoretical debate and scientific research over 
the last few decades and much knowledge has been gained about the development of 
ToM in children. However, it appears that the translation of the empirical evidence to 
practice in school settings has been limited. ToM is highly relevant to educators because 
it is important for appropriate social functioning (Astington, 1994; Baron-Cohen, 1994; 
Flavell, 1999; Razza & Blair, 2009; Samson, 2009; Sodian, 2005; Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001) and effective learning (Pelletier & Astington, 2004; Ziv et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, most learning occurs in a social context (e.g., between a teacher and a 
student, or within a group of students), and well-developed “mind-reading” skills may  
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facilitate positive and appropriate interpersonal relationships with teachers and peers, 
which are significant contributors to overall school success (Merrell & Gimpel, 1998).   
The main purpose of this article is to create a link between the research laboratory 
and the school classroom with regard to ToM so that educators can facilitate the growth 
of this important skill in their students. While a few articles providing ToM-related 
information for educators exist (e.g., Binnie, 2005), this paper adds to the current 
literature by developing school-based strategies for educators that are grounded in theory 
and science. Specific examples of strategies likely to encourage appropriate ToM growth 
in all students as well as possible approaches to remediate delayed or deficient ToM 
development will be provided (see Tables 1-4).  
Following a brief review of ToM in general, this paper presents three main types 
of theoretical conceptualizations of children‟s ToM development as an organizational 
framework within which to discuss relevant empirical findings. Theories will be 
presented individually and reviewed in some detail to provide background knowledge 
about the different explanations for ToM development, but it is not the intent of this 
article to attempt to verify any one theory as the most accurate or valid conceptualization 
of ToM development. Rather, this article ultimately will focus on integrating the 
theoretical and empirical knowledge and applying that information to educators‟ daily 
instruction and interaction with students in preschool and elementary school settings. In 
keeping with this goal, the studies included for review and discussion are those that 
appear to relate directly to schools.  
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ToM Development 
ToM begins to develop early in life, and children achieve many important 
precursors to ToM and foundational ToM skills prior to entering kindergarten. For 
example, in infancy, the majority of children express a strong interest in and preference 
for human faces and voices, demonstrate understanding of intentionality, and engage in 
social referencing (Flavell, 2004; Siegler, 1998). During the next few years of life, most 
children experience rapid growth in early ToM skills, particularly in their understanding 
of mental states. First, children begin to appreciate that people may have different desires. 
Subsequently, they recognize that their beliefs about the world may be different from 
another person‟s beliefs. Finally, around 4 years of age, children understand that a person 
may hold a belief that is not only different from theirs, but one that is false (i.e., a belief 
that does not reflect reality; Wellman & Liu, 2004).  
False belief understanding has long been considered the hallmark of ToM and 
much research has investigated children‟s ability to successfully demonstrate this skill 
(e.g., Kloo & Perner, 2003; Slomkowski & Dunn, 1996; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In 
fact, for many of the studies presented in the upcoming sections of this article, false belief 
understanding served as the main indicator of children‟s ToM status because performance 
on these types of tasks is related to actual social behavior (Astington & Jenkins, 1995). 
However, as false belief understanding is only one of many ToM skills, researchers also 
have explored the development of a wider range of ToM skills (e.g., appearance-reality 
distinction, deception, perspective-taking, emotion understanding) and results have 
supported the conclusion that ToM undergoes significant growth between 3 and 5 years  
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of age (Flynn, 2006; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Wellman & Liu, 
2004).  
These early milestones of ToM development are considered to be the foundational 
skills that set the stage for a progression of growth that continues after the early 
childhood years. For instance, children begin to understand mixed emotions and to 
develop conceptual perspective-taking from age 5 to 7 years (Ketelaars, van 
Weerdenburg, Verhoeven, Cuperus, & Jansonius, 2010). Increasingly higher-order and 
complex ToM skills are acquired during the later childhood and adolescent years, 
including an understanding of second-order false belief (i.e., to hold a false belief about 
someone else‟s belief; Miller, 2009), faux pas (Banerjee & Watling, 2005), and complex 
perspective-taking (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). Moreover, ToM has been 
found to facilitate growth in metacognitive knowledge, or thinking about one‟s own 
thinking, which has important implications for school performance (Lockl & Schneider, 
2007).  
Theoretical Accounts of ToM Development 
All theories of ToM development have in common the idea that ToM abilities 
improve with age, however, each perspective provides a unique explanation for how and 
why that development occurs. For example, some theories emphasize the importance of 
pretend play and social interaction, while others point to broad, foundational skills like 
language and executive functions as significant contributors to ToM development. Three 
main types of theoretical accounts discussed frequently in the literature will be reviewed: 
modularist perspectives, socialization-based theories, and cognitive components models.  
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Modularity 
Modularity theory in general purports that the brain consists of specialized neural 
structures, or modules, that are responsible for human development and functioning 
(Fodor, 1983). These modules are skill-specific and considered to be relatively 
independent of one another because the flow of information between modules is 
restricted. Modules operate quickly and their activation is mandatory. For example, a 
module that is specialized to process visual information will do so automatically every 
time visual information is available. Due to the encapsulated nature of modules, neither 
development nor impairment in one skill area typically will transfer to other abilities 
(Flavell et al., 2002; Fodor, 1983). Modularity models have been proposed to account for 
ToM development, the most frequently cited of which include the Theory of Mind 
Mechanism/Selection Processing model (ToMM/SP, Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004; 
Scholl & Leslie, 1999) and Minimalist Innate Modularity Theory (Baron-Cohen, 1994; 
1998).  
In the ToMM/SP model, the ToMM module is an innate component of our 
cognitive architecture that is triggered by the environment during maturation (Leslie et 
al., 2004; Scholl & Leslie, 1999). When an individual is presented with relevant 
environmental input, ToMM “spontaneously and post-perceptually attends to behaviors 
and infers (i.e., computes) the mental states which contributed to them” (Scholl & Leslie, 
1999, p. 147). This module is, in a sense, programmed to provide a response that reflects 
the natural inclination that a person‟s beliefs are true. When presented with a false belief, 
the Selection Processing (SP) component is supposed to inhibit the prepotent but  
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incorrect response. However, SP develops over time and is not fully formed in children 
younger than 4 years. Therefore, according to the ToMM/SP model, the reason that 
children younger than 4 years typically fail false belief tasks is not that they lack the 
conceptual understanding of belief (because they have a fully functioning ToMM), but 
rather that their immature SP fails to inhibit the default true-belief response. Additionally, 
ToMM/SP theory asserts that the environment is necessary to trigger the innate process 
(i.e., turn the module “on”), but it does not contribute to the essential character of ToM 
skills (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). Due to modular characteristics, the sequence and end-
result of ToM development should be highly consistent and stable across individuals, 
regardless of environmental differences (Scholl & Leslie, 1999; Scholl & Leslie, 2001).  
Another modular interpretation of ToM is presented by Simon Baron-Cohen‟s 
(1992; 1994; 1998) Minimalist Innate Modularity Theory, which refers to a mindreading 
system that has evolved specifically to enable us to connect others‟ behaviors to their 
mental states. This model proposes a set of modules that extract basic sensory 
information from the environment that is important for social interactions and provides 
critical data for ToM development. More specifically, a young child gathers social 
information from the environment by way of the Intentionality Detector (ID), which 
evaluates a person‟s movements to or away from a target to determine the goal and 
desire, and the Eye Direction Detector (EDD), which detects the presence and direction 
of another person‟s eyes. This information is passed on to the Shared Attention 
Mechanism (SAM), which analyzes whether the child and another person are both 
attending to the same thing (i.e., produces joint-attention behaviors) and then activates  
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ToMM. ToMM integrates the sensory information processed by SAM with the mental-
state knowledge held by ToMM in order to produce “a coherent and usable „theory‟ for 
the human child and adult to employ” (p. 536; Baron-Cohen, 1994). Although these 
modular components are presumed to be present and functioning by age 4 years, Baron-
Cohen‟s Minimalist Innate Modularity Theory does not suggest, in contrast to Leslie‟s 
ToMM/SP model, that ToM is fully formed at birth (Baron-Cohen, 1998). Furthermore, 
the Minimalist Innate Modularity Theory does not adhere to all of the principles of 
modularity, for example, allowing for some exchange of information between the four 
components in order to fully process the information and direct an appropriate response 
(Baron-Cohen, 1994, 1998).  
Empirical evidence. Support for the modularity of ToM comes from research 
highlighting the universal nature of ToM development; children from all cultures across 
the world acquire the same ToM abilities (Avis & Harris, 1991; Doherty, 2009; Scholl & 
Leslie, 1999). In addition, evidence indicating a specific ToM deficit in individuals with 
autism (Baron-Cohen, 1991, 1992; Scholl & Leslie, 2001) and individuals with focal 
brain damage (Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001; Winner, Brownell, Happe, Blum, & 
Pincus, 1998) suggests that there may be distinct neural circuits or brain structures 
responsible for ToM that are vulnerable to selective impairment. Over the past decade, an 
increasing number of investigators have employed functional brain imaging techniques to 
track brain activity when adults engage in ToM tasks (see Brune & Brune-Cohrs, 2006 
and Saxe, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Scholz, & Pelphrey, 2009 for a review). Findings suggested 
that the neural network subserving ToM abilities included the junction between the  
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temporal and parietal lobes, particularly in the right hemisphere, and the frontal lobes. 
Recent studies utilizing neuroimaging and EEG analysis techniques with children have 
confirmed these findings (Liu, Sabbagh, Gehring, & Wellman, 2009; Sabbagh, Bowman, 
Evraire, & Ito, 2009) and provided new evidence that the neural organization of ToM 
becomes increasingly specialized with age (Saxe et al., 2009). The possibility that the 
neural network underlying ToM develops gradually over time challenges the 
conceptualization that ToM is an innate, preformed module.  
As noted, a basic assertion of modularity theories is that ToM will develop 
automatically at the appropriate time during maturation. Thus, researchers ascribing to 
this view have not investigated ways to ensure or enhance ToM development in children 
experiencing typical development. Rather, their focus has been on studying those 
children who appear to have a specific impairment in the ToM module and thus have 
great difficulty understanding and interpreting others‟ mental states, such as children with 
autism (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1991). A growing body of research has focused on 
developing interventions to address these children‟s ToM deficits. A review of these 
training studies will be presented in this section. Subsequently, the conclusion section of 
this article will highlight the ways that educators can utilize the training strategies in the 
school setting.  
Some of the first studies in this area focused on training children with autism to 
pass ToM tasks, for example by allowing repeated trials, modeling, and giving feedback 
about appropriate answers to a false belief task. Generally, these attempts have resulted in 
the children successfully passing the trained false belief task, but demonstrating limited  
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to no generalization of their training to other ToM tasks or to real-world social situations 
(e.g., Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin, & Hill, 1996; Swettenham, 1996). These results 
suggested that children with autism were unable to truly understand that mental states are 
representations of the world (what is seen, what is heard, etc; McGregor, Whiten, & 
Blackburn, 1998a). In contrast, strategies that teach children with autism to represent the 
world through physical or visual states have produced success on both training and 
transfer tasks. These physical representations have been used to stand in for mental states 
as well as to facilitate the understanding that mental states represent the world (e.g., 
Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez, & Walsh, 1996; Wellman, Baron-Cohen, Caswell, 
Gomez, Swettenham, Toye, et al., 2002).  
One approach that has been investigated is the use of photographs to represent 
another person‟s thoughts and beliefs (McGregor et al., 1998a; McGregor, Whiten, & 
Blackburn, 1998b; Swettenham et al., 1996). These photographs are inserted into a 
specially-constructed slot in a mannequin or doll‟s head to physically show the children 
that “the eye is like a camera and that people have pictures in their heads” (Swettenham 
et al., 1996; p. 75). Results from one study revealed that emphasizing to children that the 
picture represents a person‟s thoughts, and that it is the thought that directs the action (not 
the picture) was an important factor in children‟s success in learning and applying the 
strategy to other ToM tasks (McGregor et al., 1998a). Emphasizing the role of thought 
appeared to enable the children with autism to demonstrate a higher level of conceptual 
understanding and generalize their learning to another laboratory false belief task; 
however, they remained unable to transfer their knowledge to a false belief task which  
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presented people in natural settings (McGregor et al., 1998a). This issue was addressed in 
a subsequent study, which used videos of real people rather than scenarios with dolls to 
help children and adults with autism to apply their learning to scenarios more similar to 
real life (McGregor et al., 1998b). After training the participants to use the picture-in-the-
head strategy, the researchers narrated short videos of false belief scenarios. They 
explained that “we can‟t put a picture in Heather‟s head, but she does have a thought in 
her head like a picture of where she saw her coat,” and directed the participants to track 
the protagonist‟s eyes to determine what she saw (p. 384, McGregor et al., 1998b). 
Following only a few hours of training, the majority of the participants (7 of 10) were 
able to pass at least two of three new video scenarios (McGregor et al., 1998b).  
Wellman and colleagues (2002) investigated how another type of physical 
representation, thought bubbles, might improve ToM in children with autism. The 
thought-bubbles format was selected based on the notion that children have some 
familiarity with thought- and speech-bubbles through their appearance in comics, 
cartoons, and some children‟s books. Additionally, the researchers believed that use of 
thought-bubbles over actual photographs and mannequins would enhance the practicality 
of the intervention strategy while hopefully facilitating the same gains in understanding 
mental states (Wellman et al., 2002). In this study, the children were taught that people 
think about what they see in the world and that thought-bubbles show what a person is 
thinking. The children‟s performance on false belief tasks as well as related ToM transfer 
tasks improved significantly from pre-test to post-test, even when thought-bubbles were 
no longer present. Their improved performance “suggests that they were indeed adopting  
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a more mentalistic strategy, probably the one instructed, which asked them to treat 
thoughts as thought-bubbles and thus pictures in the head” (Wellman et al., 2002, p. 360).  
Socialization-based Theories 
 Two main theoretical perspectives, theory theory and simulation theory, can be 
considered socialization-based accounts of ToM development in that both propose social 
experiences as a critical factor in acquiring ToM abilities (Flavell, 1999; Hughes & 
Leekam, 2004). In contrast to modularists, those ascribing to socialization-based theories 
do not believe that ToM development is hardwired. These individuals, rather, assert that 
ToM development is stimulated and influenced by interactions with others and exposure 
to ToM-related language and situations (Meltzoff, 1999; Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996).  
According to theory theory, children acquire ToM through generating and 
revising informal theories about their experiences. More specifically, children create, test, 
and modify rules (e.g., does not see = does not know) about their own and other people's 
mental states and subsequent behaviors. Changes in these rules, or theories, promote 
growth in the child's concept of the mind, which will ultimately allow them to use 
progressively complex ToM abilities to predict, explain, and manipulate behavior 
(Doherty, 2009; Flavell et al., 2002; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992, 1994). From this 
perspective, knowledge about the mind is considered to be a system of interrelated 
mental-state concepts, such as the concepts of belief, desire, and perception. Therefore, 
new understandings and growth in one aspect of ToM (e.g., desire) will spur development 
in another ToM domain (e.g., false belief; Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996). Social interactions  
with siblings, parents, and other people are thought to facilitate these conceptual changes  
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by providing children with the opportunity to gather the evidence needed to test and 
modify their theories (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991; Hughes 
& Leekam, 2004; Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki, & Berridge, 1996; 
Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994). 
Simulation theory proposes that children use their own experiences to generate an 
understanding of others‟ experiences (McGlamery, Ball, Henley, & Besozzi, 2007; 
Wellman et al., 2001). Relying on the generally veritable assumption that all minds work 
in the same basic way, children explain and predict another person‟s behavior by 
imagining what they themselves would think, do, and feel in the situation the other 
person is in (Doherty, 2009). According to simulation theory, children develop the ability 
to identify and understand their own mental states first (through introspection), and then 
generalize those mental states to other people. Role-taking and pretend play activities are 
the types of social experiences considered to activate this simulation process and thus to 
be important for the development of ToM abilities (Flavell et al., 2002).  
 Though initially proposed as distinct theories, some investigators have considered 
the idea that ToM development involves both theory revision and simulating others (e.g., 
Nichols & Stich, 2003; Perner, 1996). It has been suggested that we can make accurate 
predictions about many routine, everyday behaviors using simulation, but that some 
theoretical knowledge often is required to initiate the process (Doherty, 2009). Indeed, 
much of the empirical evidence investigating the influence of social environments and 
experiences on ToM development can be interpreted as supporting both theory theory and 
simulation theory. 
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Empirical evidence. A great deal of effort has been put into understanding how 
young children‟s social environments and experiences impact their ToM development. 
Researchers consistently have found that children‟s performance on various ToM tasks is 
related to the number of siblings they have (e.g., Jenkins & Astington, 1996; McAlister & 
Peterson, 2007; Perner et al., 1994), the amount and quality of pretend play they engage 
in (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Dunn & Cutting, 1999), and the amount of mental-
state language they are exposed to and use themselves (e.g., Brown, Donelan-McCall, & 
Dunn, 1996; Furrow, Moore, Davidge, & Chiasson, 1992). These factors will be 
discussed in detail in this section and then translated into practical school-based strategies 
for ToM development in the conclusion section of the article.  
Siblings. A consistent finding in the literature is the positive relationship between 
number of siblings and performance on tasks assessing false belief understanding by 4-
year-old children (Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Perner et al., 1994; Peterson, 2000; 
Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998). This means that as the number of 
siblings a child has increases, their performance on false belief tasks improves, even after 
improvements related to age and language ability are accounted for (McAlister & 
Peterson, 2007). While some studies have found that the “sibling effect” is present only 
for children with older siblings (e.g., Ruffman et al., 1998), other studies have revealed a 
relationship between both older and younger children and false belief performance (e.g., 
Jenkins & Astington, 1996). Conversely, children with no siblings “are delayed 
significantly behind their preschool peers with child siblings in developing the concepts 
of false belief that underpin a theory of mind” (Peterson, 2000, p. 451). In fact, there is  
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evidence showing that children with two siblings gain as much as one year‟s worth of 
experience over children with no siblings (Perner et al., 1994).  
Investigators have proposed that a principal reason why siblings are important for 
ToM development is because they provide children with an increased number of 
interactions highlighting the ways in which beliefs impact behavior (e.g., teasing, 
tricking, mistaken actions based on false beliefs; Jenkins & Astington, 1996; McAlister & 
Peterson, 2007). Opportunities to converse with siblings directly may not be the only way 
social interaction impacts ToM development. Indirect learning and reflection may occur 
when children have opportunities to overhear or listen in “upon conversations, 
negotiations, reminiscences, pretence, or disciplinary encounters between siblings and 
parents” (McAlister & Peterson, 2007, pp. 268-269). Additionally, research suggests that 
some of the effectiveness of siblings in aiding ToM development may be a function of 
the explanation provided by mothers when conflict between siblings arises (Dunn et al., 
1991). For example, mothers frequently were observed to explain how one child‟s beliefs 
influenced his or her behavior when attempting to straighten out misunderstandings or 
arguments between siblings (e.g., “He thought it was his turn”, Dunn et al., 1991, p. 
1363). Other research suggests that social interactions with individuals other than siblings 
may similarly influence ToM development (Lewis et al., 1996). The more frequently 
children interacted with adult relatives living nearby, the better those children performed 
on tasks assessing false belief understanding (Lewis et al., 1996).  
Pretend play. The research on pretend play suggests some of the ways that social 
interaction may benefit ToM development in children. A positive relationship has been  
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found between children‟s performance on false belief tasks and the quantity (Cutting & 
Dunn, 2006; Hughes & Dunn, 1997) and, perhaps more importantly, the quality 
(Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995) of their pretend play with 
siblings and friends. In other words, children who demonstrate more advanced false 
belief understanding tend to engage in pretend play more frequently and to demonstrate a 
more sophisticated, complex style of pretend play. These children use more frequent joint 
proposals (e.g., “Let‟s play house”) and explicit role assignments (e.g., “You be the 
mommy”) and engage in more role enacting than children who display less developed 
false belief understanding. It has been argued that “a complex and interdependent 
relationship” exists between pretend play and ToM development in that each one 
facilitates and benefits from the other (Jenkins & Astington, 2000, p. 218). It may be that 
the child‟s experience with pretend play, the acting out of different roles and 
perspectives, allows for some ToM development, and as his or her ToM skills become 
more advanced, the child is able to enhance the quality of the pretend play.  
Correlational research, like that discussed thus far, is helpful in discovering 
relationships between variables but cannot determine whether one or all of these factors 
of pretend play actually cause growth in ToM skills. Causal connections can only be 
revealed through the use of training and/or intervention studies, where one group of 
participants receiving a treatment of some sort is compared to another group of 
participants not receiving any additional or different training or intervention. In one such 
study carried out in a preschool setting, a group of 4-year-old children participated in an 
intervention aimed at improving their ToM skills by increasing the complexity of their  
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pretend play (Dockett, 1998). Complex pretend play involves imitative role play, make-
believe with objects, actions, and situations, persistence, interaction, and verbal 
communication (Smilansky, 1968). It is believed that complex pretend play provides 
opportunities for children to develop and display an increased understanding of ToM. At 
the beginning of the three-week intervention, the children visited a pizza restaurant and 
observed the chef making a pizza. Over the course of the intervention period, the children 
were given large segments of time to make, cook, serve, and eat their own pizzas in a 
special area of the classroom created specifically for the pretend play activity, including 
appropriate props and so forth. While the children engaged in this shared pretend play 
activity, adults stepped in to direct and guide the play. The adults did not model or 
actively engage in the play, but rather made comments and suggestions to elevate the 
play to a more complex level. Compared to peers at the preschool who did not receive the 
intervention, the children demonstrated significant increases in the amount and 
complexity of pretend play and in ToM development. These results strongly support the 
notion that social interaction, particularly complex shared pretend play, positively 
impacts ToM development (Dockett, 1998).  
Mental-state talk. Another strong predictor of ToM performance in young 
children is mental-state talk, or children‟s verbal references to their own or another 
person‟s thoughts, beliefs, desires, and feelings. Children who exhibit mental-state talk 
more frequently when playing with their siblings and friends demonstrate more advanced 
false belief understanding (Brown et al., 1996; Hughes & Dunn, 1997, 1998). While 
children have been observed to use mental-state terms more frequently during pretend  
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play than nonpretend play, it appears that the frequency of mental-state talk outside of 
play situations also impacts children‟s ToM development. For example, the frequency 
with which mothers referred to mental states when discussing scenarios in pictures 
predicted their child‟s later performance on ToM tasks, even after taking into account any 
contribution made by the child‟s earlier language or ToM competence. The results 
suggested that mothers‟ mental-state talk had a direct facilitative effect on their children‟s 
ToM development (Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002). In a different study, the children of 
mothers who reported being in favor of explaining and elaborating upon mental-state 
concepts during natural social interactions with their children demonstrated significantly 
advanced false belief understanding (Peterson & Slaughter, 2003). Furthermore, a 
mother‟s use of mental-state language when disciplining her child was found to relate to 
her child‟s performance on false belief tasks (Ruffman, Perner, & Parkin, 1999). For 
example, it appeared that a child may be prompted to take on the perspective of another 
person when a mother asks, “How would you feel if…” during a disciplinary encounter, 
and that this type of role taking may promote ToM development. Conversely, no 
relationship was found between children‟s false belief performance and disciplinary 
tactics not involving mental-state language, such as general discussion of the issue or 
basic reprimands, perhaps because these tactics do not explicitly invite children to engage 
in perspective- or role-taking (Ruffman et al., 1999).  
Researchers also have investigated how ToM development might be impacted by 
young children‟s reading materials, which often recount social situations and contain 
mental-state language and concepts (Cassidy et al., 1998). In fact, in an extensive review  
           19 
of 90 books for children aged 3 to 6 years, references to and expressions of characters‟ 
emotions, beliefs, and intentions were found to occur once in approximately every three 
sentences (Dyer, Shatz, & Wellman, 2000). The prevalence of mental-state language in 
young children‟s reading materials may be likely to provide a “rich source of 
information” for ToM development (Dyer et al., 2000, p. 31). Consistent with this claim, 
the reported frequency with which parents read picture books to their children at home 
has been found to relate positively to the children‟s level of false belief understanding 
(Adrian, Clemente, Villanueva, & Rieffe, 2005). In addition, observations of parent-child 
picture book reading have revealed that the more often that mothers used cognitive-state 
terms (e.g., know, think, believe) when telling stories, the better the children performed 
on ToM tasks (Adrian et al., 2005; Adrian, Clemente, & Villanueva, 2007). Mothers were 
observed to use mental-state terms when explaining the characters‟ thoughts and 
behaviors in the story, and also when referring to their own and their children‟s thoughts 
during questioning and reflecting about the story. More frequent use of emotional-state 
terms (e.g., happy, sad, scared) has also been linked to higher levels of ToM development 
(Adrian et al., 2005).  
An intervention study suggested that the actual expression of mental-state terms 
may not be required and that children‟s interaction with reading materials that present 
mental-state concepts (e.g., trickery, lies, false beliefs) implicitly may be sufficient, and 
even better, for ToM development (Peskin & Astington, 2004). A sample of 4-year-old 
prekindergarten students listened to six different stories read aloud on multiple occasions 
by teachers, research assistants, and parents over the course of four weeks. The plot lines  
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of the stories were the same, but the presentation of mental-state terms differed between 
the experimental and control groups. For the children in the experimental group, the 
stories contained explicit belief terms (e.g., think, know, guess, remember), while the 
stories presented to the control group did not contain belief terms but referred implicitly 
to mental states in general. The intense exposure to mentalistic stories produced 
significant gains in ToM development for both groups of children. Interestingly, the 
children in the control group did as well as the children in the experimental group at 
predicting false beliefs and were significantly better at explaining false beliefs. The 
investigators interpreted these results through the lens of Vygotsky‟s socio-cultural 
theory of constructivism, and stated: 
The implicit mentalistic concepts in the text and illustrations may have provided 
an optimal level of scaffolding to challenge the listeners to make inferences such 
as not seeing Toby in the physical world and, therefore, not knowing in the mental 
world. These inferences lead to an understanding that may be all the deeper 
because the children had to strive to infer meaning. Ironically, the more direct, 
explicit condition may have produced less conceptual development precisely 
because it was explicit (Peskin & Astington, 2004, p. 266). 
 
A recent study confirmed the relationship between the frequency of children‟s 
book reading and ToM development and extended it to include the frequency of exposure 
to children‟s films (Mar, Tackett, & Moore, 2010). In contrast, exposure to television was 
not found to be related to ToM development. The authors proposed that films may be 
more effective at facilitating ToM development because, due to the extended length in 
viewing time, parents may be more likely to watch films rather than television shows 
with their children. This would make films more of a social viewing experience and may 
encourage parents to discuss events and characters with their children. Alternatively,  
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films may provide more opportunities for mental simulation than television shows.  
Cognitive Components Conceptualizations 
Cognitive components conceptualizations propose that one or more cognitive skill 
areas are related to or involved in ToM development in some way. The majority of 
investigative efforts have been focused on language or executive functions (EF), 
particularly the abilities to exhibit self-control (inhibition), temporarily hold in mind and 
manipulate relevant information (working memory), and shift flexibly between tasks or 
ideas (cognitive flexibility, or set-shifting). Like ToM, language and EF also are 
undergoing significant growth during the early childhood years (Astington & Jenkins, 
1999; Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Perner & Lang, 1999). Thus, there has been a lot of interest 
in investigating the developmental relationships and determining whether growth in these 
skill areas is independent or interdependent. Different theoretical models have been 
proposed and tested, the results of which will be reviewed below.  
Generally speaking, these theorists conceptualize that one of these cognitive skills 
are necessary either for the emergence or the expression of ToM, or both (Perner & Lang, 
1999). Emergence accounts suggest that a certain level of skill in language or EF must be 
obtained before children are able to develop an understanding of mind, while expression 
accounts indicate that an individual must use language or EF skills in order to 
demonstrate that they have developed ToM. For example, with regard to EF, one 
theoretical model presents a combination of emergence and expression positions and 
posits that not only are EF skills, such as inhibition and working memory, involved in 
performing ToM tasks (i.e., expression), but also that they are prerequisites for children‟s  
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ToM development (i.e., emergence; Carlson & Moses, 2001). A contrasting perspective 
that ToM skills are essential to the development of EF has also been presented (Perner, 
1998). Still another view speculates that ToM and EF are interdependent and the 
influence on development is bidirectional (Sodian & Hulsken, 2005).  
Similarly, with regard to language skills, researchers have proposed an integral 
role for language in both developing and expressing ToM skills, with some debate over 
whether the critical building block is general language ability or a specific component of 
language, such as syntax (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; de Villiers, 2000; see also 
Astington & Baird, 2005). Like EF, a reciprocal relationship between language and ToM 
development has been proposed (de Villiers, 2007).    
Theories that consider the role of both EF and language skills in ToM 
development and use have also been presented (Hasselhorn, Mahler, & Grube, 2005; 
Samson, 2009; Schneider, Lockl, & Fernandez, 2005). For the purpose of brevity, one 
example of this combination model recently proposed by Klaus Oberauer (2005) will be 
discussed. Building on many of the specific EF theories and language theories previously 
mentioned, Oberauer asserted that the following components together undergird the 
development of ToM: inhibition, working memory, syntax, and the phonological loop. 
More specifically, Oberauer hypothesized that individuals need adequately developed 
inhibitory skills to be able to set aside their own knowledge of the reality of the situation 
before being able to form a mental representation of another person‟s false belief and 
subsequently predict their future behavior based on that false belief. The phonological 
loop is proposed to help with this effort by providing verbal self-instructions. Working  
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memory capacity might contribute to the emergence of ToM by providing cognitive 
space to consider and contrast multiple beliefs and situations, while syntax might assist 
by allowing for the creation of complex sentences that express complex thoughts 
(Oberauer, 2005).   
Empirical evidence. Studies into the relation and impact of language and EF on 
ToM development have been plentiful. Correlational research will be reviewed first, 
followed by intervention and training studies addressing the potential contributions of 
language and EF to ToM development. Finally, in the conclusion section of this article, 
the empirical evidence will be integrated and translated into usable school-based 
strategies.   
 Investigations into the associations between ToM and language have revealed 
significant correlations between the two skill areas. Children who have strong overall 
language ability tend to perform well on ToM tasks, and children who have weak general 
language skills typically perform poorly on ToM tasks (Jenkins & Astington, 1996; 
Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Schneider et al., 2005). When researchers have looked at 
whether specific aspects of language are associated with ToM performance the results 
have been inconsistent. For example, one study revealed that syntax, but not semantics 
(Astington & Jenkins, 1999) was related to ToM, however, another study found the 
opposite (Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003, Experiment 1). 
Overall, stronger support has been garnered for the link between general, rather than 
specific, language skills and ToM (Ruffman et al., 2003; Slade & Ruffman, 2005; Tardif, 
So, & Kaciroti, 2007).  
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Similarly, research examining the relationships between ToM and EF generally 
has found a positive association between the two developing skill areas. In other words, 
children with more advanced ToM skills tend to demonstrate a stronger ability to inhibit 
their behavior (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Chasiotis, Kiessling, Hofer, & Campos, 2006; 
Razza & Blair, 2009), use working memory (Gordon & Olson, 1998; Hughes, 1998a; 
Slade & Ruffman, 2005), and shift flexibly between thoughts and actions (Müller, 
Zelazo, & Imrisek, 2005; Kloo, Perner, & Giritzer, 2010). These relationships may exist 
because “executive processes are recruited in…social understanding where multiple 
perspectives have to be considered, self-knowledge inhibited, and beliefs considered in 
relation to subsequent emotions or actions” (Bull, Phillips, & Conway, 2008, p. 670). 
Several studies have found that children are more successful on ToM tasks when the EF 
demands inherent in the tasks are reduced (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998; see also 
Wellman et al., 2001); however, contradictory evidence exists (e.g., Perner, Lang, & 
Kloo, 2002). Alternatively, these relationships may exist because EF skills are involved 
in ToM development (i.e., emergence accounts).  
Longitudinal studies have looked at language-ToM and EF-ToM relationships 
over time to determine if early ability in one skill predicts later ability in another skill. 
Most consistently, studies have found that early inhibition (Carlson, Mandell, & 
Williams, 2004; Flynn, 2007; Hughes, 1998b; Hughes & Ensor, 2007a), general language 
competence (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Schneider et al., 2005), and syntax (Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002) predicted later ToM. This evidence suggests 
that these cognitive components play a critical role in ToM development. The data  
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regarding early working memory is less clear, however, and evidence has been found for 
(Hughes & Ensor, 2007a) and against (Schneider et al., 2005; Slade & Ruffman, 2005) a 
predictive relationship with later ToM. When the reverse relationships have been 
considered, early ToM skills have not been found to be a significant predictor of later EF 
ability (Carlson et al., 2004; Flynn, 2007; Hughes, 1998b; Pellicano, 2010; Schneider et 
al., 2005), however, the findings with regard to language have been inconsistent. Some 
evidence indicated that early ToM does predict later language skills (Slade & Ruffman, 
2005), but other data indicated that it does not (Astington & Jenkins, 1999). Taken 
together, these results provide strong support for the view that inhibition and language are 
critical building blocks of ToM, and partial support for the notion that the relationship 
between language and ToM is reciprocal. However, as previously discussed, these types 
of studies cannot identify a causal connection with certainty.  
Fortunately, intervention and training studies are able to provide answers to 
questions about whether development in one skill area serves as an underlying (causal) 
factor for development in another skill area. If inhibition and language are prerequisites 
for ToM development, then providing children with training in these underlying skill 
areas should result in improved ToM. These training procedures, if found to be effective, 
have the potential to be translated into school-based strategies to improve ToM. While a 
good number of studies have attempted to train particular EF and language skills in 
children, only those that have aimed to improve ToM through EF or language training 
will be reviewed.  
With regard to EF, preschool children who received brief training (two individual  
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sessions) on a card sorting task requiring inhibition and cognitive flexibility greatly 
improved their performance on tasks assessing false belief understanding, though not 
significantly so when compared to the control group (Kloo & Perner, 2003). A 
complementary effect was found for a different group of children who received training 
on false beliefs and false statements. These children, who were led through a step-by-step 
explanation of how a false belief occurs, showed considerable improvement on the card 
sorting task. Together these results suggest that the developmental link between EF and 
ToM is bidirectional; however, no strong causal explanation can be made due to lack of 
statistically significant findings (Kloo & Perner, 2003).  
 A card sorting task was utilized in another training study that investigated the EF-
ToM relationship in a sample of children with autism, who are known to have deficits in 
both skill areas (Fisher & Happe, 2005). The EF training explained and emphasized the 
need to change problem-solving strategies during the card sorting task. Children in this 
training group watched demonstrations of the task and were given time to practice. For 
the children in the ToM training group, the “photos in the head” strategy previously 
discussed was utilized (Swettenham et al., 1996). For both groups, training was 
conducted individually in brief daily sessions over the course of about a week. 
Interestingly, the EF training was found to improve ToM performance, but the effects 
were not seen until follow-up testing two months later suggesting that the children 
needed time to process and apply the new skills. The investigators suggested that set-
shifting training may have facilitated the children‟s ability to see different perspectives, 
which then led to growth in ToM skills. For the ToM-trained children, improved ToM,  
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but not EF, skills were demonstrated.  
With regard to language, at least two training studies have addressed the questions 
raised about what aspects of language (e.g., syntax) might impact ToM development. 
Training in one study was centered on one-on-one discussion between a preschool child 
and adult about deceptive objects (objects that appear to be one thing at first, but have 
another function when examined more closely; e.g., an apple that is really a candle). The 
type of language used in these discussions varied across the different training groups. The 
results revealed that simply providing the children with experience with deceptive objects 
was not enough to promote ToM development. Rather, the children “needed to have that 
experience structured by some language from other persons” (Lohmann & Tomasello, 
2003, p. 1139). The training condition that combined perspective-shifting discourse and a 
form of syntax called sentential complements (e.g., I think that it is an apple; You know 
that it is a candle) had the most significant impact on the children‟s ToM development 
(Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). Further support for the role of syntax in ToM 
development was found in a study that focused specifically on training children to report 
the content of sentential complements that did not include mental-state verbs or a 
deceptive context (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003). Rather than discussing what a person 
thinks or knows, the child was asked to report what someone said (a communication verb) 
in a story. This strengthens the claim that the growth in ToM was facilitated by learning 
about syntax, rather than learning about mental-state terms or deception (Hale & Tager-
Flusberg, 2003).   
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Applications and Implications for Schools 
Thus far, this paper has provided a review of three main types of theoretical 
explanations for ToM development and the related empirical evidence. With regard to the 
theoretical information, it seems to be most valuable to consider how each perspective 
might explain one piece of the puzzle. In other words, their differences do not necessarily 
make them incompatible. Therefore, rather than focusing on the disparities among the 
theories, it may best to merge those conceptual differences into a coherent framework and 
consider that ToM development may have a uniquely human, innate component that is 
impacted by interactions with family members, friends, and other individuals as well as 
supported by growth in related cognitive skills like language and executive functions. 
Children‟s ToM development likely will experience the greatest benefit if we are able to 
address as many potential routes of influence as possible.  
Overall, the empirical evidence supports the conceptualizations indicating that 
opportunity for social interaction and development in language skills and executive 
functions provide children with the resources/building blocks for ToM development. 
Furthermore, studies have shown that there are ways to facilitate growth in children 
whose ToM development is delayed or deviant. The final section of this paper will 
highlight the applicability of these scientific results to the school setting. Although some 
children will acquire ToM skills without additional intervention, all children would 
benefit from direct instruction of ToM skills. When a skill is taught directly, children are 
able to learn the skill in a more efficient manner. The more efficiently and 
comprehensively a child is able to acquire ToM, the more available he or she will be to  
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all of the benefits of education. In accordance with Vygotsky‟s view, instruction is 
particularly effective at facilitating development in cognitive skills, such as ToM, during 
the initial period of growth for that skill (Gredler & Shields, 2008). As the preschool and 
early elementary period is a time ripe for ToM development (Wellman et al., 2001), this 
section will provide research-based strategies that early education teachers can implement 
to provide direct instruction in ToM.  
Strategies to encourage growth in ToM skills have been developed in various 
ways from the theoretical and empirical evidence reviewed in this paper. One way that 
strategies were developed was to directly replicate a training scheme that was tested 
empirically and found to facilitate ToM development. Another method of strategy 
generation was to modify or adapt an effective intervention implemented in a different 
setting or with a different group of students to better fit the school environment. 
Additionally, frequently-used teaching practices that are consistent with research-based 
methods of ToM development are included as strategies. Two types of strategies will be 
presented: universal strategies, which are likely to encourage ToM development in all 
students, and intensive strategies, which may be appropriate for students who appear to 
demonstrate delayed or deficient ToM skills and to need more focused support and 
remediation. Also included in this section are several tables that present specific, practical 
strategies for educators to use in their daily instruction and interaction with students. The 
strategies in the tables are grouped by grade level(s) so that they are developmentally 
appropriate for children in the specified grade level. In the earlier grades (prekindergarten 
through grade 1), the strategies address foundational ToM skills as well as provide higher  
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levels of direct instruction and support. Strategies designed for grades 2 and 3 either 
involve less support from the teacher or introduce higher-level ToM skills.  
Universal Strategies 
It appears that there are three main ways that teachers can implement strategies to 
encourage ToM development in all children: instructional techniques, socialization 
opportunities, and disciplinary methods. These will be discussed in more detail in the 
subsequent paragraphs, with specific examples of strategies presented in Tables 1-3. 
Some strategies involve more than mode of intervention, but will be discussed within the 
category that the strategy is most closely tied to.  
Instructional techniques. There are many ways that teachers can incorporate 
ToM strategies into their current instructional practices. For example, the research related 
to mental-state terms and concepts in children‟s stories and films is particularly relevant 
for educators and appears to be easily translated into feasible school-based strategies (see 
Table 1). In many preschool and early elementary school classrooms, teachers read books 
to their classes on a daily basis. An easy way to address ToM development at the same 
time would be to select books that have a high level of mental-state content in the text or 
storyline to read during this instructional segment on a weekly or monthly basis. Table 1 
suggests three ways to extend this strategy for use with older students. In a related 
strategy, when teachers occasionally show short films or full-length movies to students 
they could follow up with a class discussion of ToM content or concepts from the video 
(e.g., discussion of mistaken beliefs, trickery, surprises, changes in knowledge). 
Encourage students to reflect on the characters‟ thoughts, knowledge, desires, and  
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Grade 
Level 
GENERAL STRATEGIES: INSTRUCTION 
PreK – 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2-3 
Read books that have a high level of explicit or implicit mental state 
content (e.g., Three Little Pigs, Hanzel and Gretel, Little Red Riding 
Hood). In books with a high level of explicit mental state content, you will 
often find words such as “think”, “know”, “want”, “feel”, and other mental 
state terms in the text. Books that have a high level of implicit mental state 
may not use mental state terms in the text, but the storyline/pictures will 
cover situations involving trickery, misunderstanding, lies, etc.   
 
When discussing the books with the children, teachers should highlight 
characters‟ mental states and ask questions about what they are thinking, 
what they know, what they want, and how they feel, and how those mental 
states might influence what the character does or says later in the story.  
 
In higher grades, the teacher may not need to lead this activity and students 
can discuss these concepts in small groups or pairs (discussion of mental 
states; prediction of future behavior based on what is known about the 
character at that point in the story). 
 
After exposure to this strategy, advanced variations could include: 
 
Ask students to create new endings to stories by changing what one of the 
characters believed or felt (e.g., if the Prince knew that the glass slipper 
belonged to Cinderella, what might he have done differently?). This can be 
done orally or in writing, individually or in small groups/pairs. 
 
Have students create their own ToM-related stories from beginning to end, 
using mental state terms and/or storylines involving misunderstandings, 
different perspectives/beliefs/desires, trickery, or deception.  
 
Related References: Adrian et al., 2005, 2007; Peskin & Astington, 2004 
PreK-3 Show a movie, such as The Fox and the Hound, to the class and lead 
students in discussion of characters‟ mental states (thoughts, desires, 
feelings, memories, etc) and situations involving misunderstandings, 
trickery, deception, etc.  
 
Related Reference: Mar et al., 2010 
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PreK-3 Instruction in Extracting Content of False Complements 
 
Depending on grade level, teachers (or students) read short stories in 
which one character tells another character one thing, but does something 
else (e.g. Tommy is in the kitchen eating cookies. Tommy‟s mom called to 
him from the living room and asked him what he was doing. Tommy said, 
“I‟m eating an apple.”). Children are asked to report what the character 
said (e.g., What did Tommy say?), which requires them to extract the 
content of the false complement. Provide feedback and correction as 
necessary.  
 
Teachers should aim to implement this strategy in three to four brief 
sessions over the course of a few weeks. Potentially, teacher could monitor 
the students‟ performance across these sessions to roughly assess their rate 
of development and mastery. 
 
Related Reference: Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003 
PreK-3 Exposure to Deceptive Objects 
 
Select items that demonstrate the idea that there can be a difference 
between what something seems to be and what it really is (e.g., a candle 
that looks like an apple; a pen that looks like a flower). When discussing 
these deceptive objects with students (in whole-group setting), be sure to 
highlight different perspectives between students as well as within each 
student (i.e., what the student initially thought the item was versus what 
they now know it is after gaining a new perspective) and to use sentential 
complements in your expressions. An example depicting one way to utilize 
perspective-shifting discourse and sentential complements is presented in 
the Appendix. 
 
Related Reference: Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003 
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Grade Level GENERAL STRATEGIES: SOCIAL INTERACTION 
 
 
PreK-K 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-3 
Pretend Play 
 
Regularly scheduled sessions of pretend play for preschool and 
kindergarten students; teachers monitor and guide play to increase 
complexity. (Complexity is evidenced by frequency of role assignments 
(“I will be the mommy”), role enactment (pretending to be the mommy), 
reciprocal, verbal communication between play partners, and engaging in 
make-believe with objects (e.g., using a hat as a bucket) and actions (e.g., 
pretending to drink a cup of milk). 
 
 
During “inside” recess, divide students into small groups and give them 
roles and scenarios to act out. Provide materials to use as props. Possible 
scenarios might include: hospital operating room, pizza restaurant, school 
classroom, baseball game, bird watching, shipwrecked on an island. 
Monitor play and provide guiding questions and comments as needed to 
increase complexity.  
  
Related References: Cutting & Dunn, 2006; Astington & Jenkins, 1995; 
Youngblade & Dunn, 1995; Hughes & Dunn, 1997; Dockett, 1998; 
Jenkins & Astington, 1996 
All grades Teacher interaction with students  
 
Elaborate (verbally or behaviorally) on mental state concepts whenever 
possible when conversing with students. See examples of elaborative 
mental state talk in Appendix. 
 
For example, describe thoughts as images in the mind (when seeing leads 
to knowing) that can slip out of the mind through forgetting. Act out an 
unconventional pretence in play (e.g., use a banana as a telephone). 
Explain people‟s puzzling or disturbing behavior (e.g., fear, sadness, 
lying) by drawing attention to the relationship between inner mental states 
and the resulting behavior. 
 
Related Reference: Peterson & Slaughter, 2003 
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Grade Level GENERAL STRATEGIES: DISCIPLINE 
All grades Use mental state language when helping students resolve conflicts (e.g., 
think, feel, believe, know, want, remember) and discuss others‟ thoughts 
and feelings 
    
    Ex: Teacher sees Timmy yelling at Coby. Following appropriate 
disciplinary action and consequence, discuss the situation with Timmy. 
“Timmy, why did you yell at Coby? (Because he was using the brown 
marker that I was going to use for my drawing.) Did Coby know that you 
wanted to use the brown marker? (I don‟t know.) Did you tell him or ask 
him for the brown marker? (No.) It seems to me that Coby did not know 
that you wanted to use the brown marker. If he had known, he probably 
would not have used that marker.” 
    Ex: “How do you think that Bobby felt when you called him a 
„dummy‟? How would you feel if someone called you a „dummy‟? Do 
you think that Bobby wants to be friends with a person who called him a 
„dummy‟?”  
 
Variation: When appropriate, facilitate the process of students sharing 
with each other their respective thoughts and feelings when resolving 
conflict. 
 
Related References: Dunn et al., 1991; FitzGerald & White, 1995; 
Ruffman et al., 1999   
 
 
emotions and explain how those mental states impacted the characters‟ behavior and thus 
the story line of the book or movie.  
This “reflect and explain” strategy can be utilized during instruction in all 
academic areas. Astington (1998) recommends that teachers ask children to think about 
and explain their knowledge (e.g., “How do you know that?”) and problem-solving 
process (e.g., “Tell us how you figured out that 5 + 3 = 8.”). Educators can model the 
strategy by explaining their own thought processes and acknowledging aloud when they 
have learned something new or realized they held a mistaken belief.   
Additionally, the research that indicated the important role of general language  
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ability as a building block for ToM development is highly relevant to educators. From the 
time children enter school, language is an important area of instruction that relates to 
children‟s success in almost every academic skill. Now that the impact of language on 
children‟s social skills through its role and relation to ToM development is evident, 
educators have even more reason to help their students develop strong language skills. 
Furthermore, they can consider supplementing their current language instruction with the 
ToM-related language strategies presented in Table 1 (false complements and deceptive 
objects). The ToM-related language strategies could be implemented in a single session 
or in multiple sessions over the course of the year to gain a rough assessment of students‟ 
conceptual development with these skills.  
Opportunities for social interaction. Significant correlations between false 
belief performance and quality and quantity of pretend play, frequency and complexity of 
mental-state talk, and number of siblings suggest that these factors are important for 
children‟s ToM development and, by extension, their social lives. Considered broadly, 
this evidence implies that “abundant and successful social interactions most likely 
provide the opportunity for increased learning about thought-behavior relations” (Watson 
et al., 1999, p. 390). 
The research indicating the importance of socialization opportunities for ToM 
development reinforces at least two activities already utilized in most classrooms and 
schools. These activities are time for free play and social interaction during the school 
day (e.g., recess, lunch) and use of cooperative learning dyads and groups (e.g., active 
listening, Think-Pair-Share, Doughnut, Jigsaw, Round Robin). Providing students with  
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these opportunities for peer interaction is likely to increase their exposure to others‟ 
perspectives and beliefs and subsequently support appropriate ToM growth. 
Another type of social interaction that is closely tied to ToM development is 
pretend play. Schools seem to be well-suited for providing opportunities for students to 
engage in shared pretense in a supportive environment and with the potential for adult 
intervention. Table 2 proposes four specific ways to provide and structure these social 
interactions at different grade levels in the school setting. For example, at the preschool 
level, it may be possible for educators to incorporate pretend play sessions into the daily 
or weekly schedule throughout the school year. At the elementary level, when time for 
social activities can be limited, teachers could use pretend play as an activity for “inside” 
recess (i.e., when it is raining, or outside recess is unavailable for some other reason). 
Scenarios and roles could be provided by the teacher or created by the students. Across 
all grade levels, teachers should monitor the play and increase the complexity by making 
comments and suggestions about how to assign specific roles, engage in role play, and 
use objects as representations of other things.  
Furthermore, the manner in which teachers interact with students can be important 
for ToM development. Educators are encouraged to elaborate on mental-state concepts 
whenever the opportunity arises in their conversations with students (see Table 2 and 
Appendix for examples). During these teachable moments, educators should focus on 
linking thoughts with behaviors and explaining ToM concepts (e.g., seeing leads to 
knowing; people have different desires, beliefs, feelings).  
Disciplinary Methods. Based on the evidence regarding mothers‟ use of mental- 
           37 
state talk during discipline, teachers and administrators are recommended to use mental-
state terms (e.g., believe, think, want, know) when resolving conflicts among students. 
Instead of simply saying “No” or “Don‟t do that,” educators should aim to discuss a 
child‟s behavior in terms of the thoughts and feelings the behavior might provoke in 
another person (see Table 3 for an example). Furthermore, when appropriate, have the 
students share with one another the thoughts and feelings they were experiencing during 
the particular event. It is important for educators to understand that these suggestions are 
intended to complement, not replace, behavioral and punitive approaches to student 
discipline by attending to the cognitive component when appropriate. 
Intensive Strategies 
 Intensive strategies would be appropriate for students who demonstrate a more 
significant level of social, emotional, or behavioral problems than most of their peers that 
may in part be due to insufficient ToM development. In order to address the greater needs 
of these students, the intensity of a universal strategy could be increased by providing it 
in a small-group or one-on-one setting and on a more frequent basis. In order to increase 
the intensity of the mental-state book reading strategy, for example, a teacher could lead a 
small group of students through 20-minute reading sessions three times each week, rather 
than once a week or once a month. The small group setting would allow the teacher to 
better assess each student‟s current level of understanding and intervene more frequently 
and directly in order to facilitate a higher level of ToM development. Table 4 provides 
additional examples of translating universal strategies into intensive strategies.  
 Alternatively, a student may benefit from a different type of approach to ToM  
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Grade level INTENSIVE STRATEGIES 
PreK-3 Increased intensity of a general strategy in small-group or one-on-one 
setting 
 Book reading with emphasis on mental state content/language (3-5 
days per week for 20 minutes) 
 
PreK-5 
(mental age 
of at least 4 
years) 
Picture-in-head training 
 
Materials needed: doll or mannequin head; camera; printed pictures of 
objects, scenarios (e.g., ball in the garage) 
Main purpose of training: to teach children that “the eye is like a camera 
and that people have pictures in their heads” 
 
Model task, providing explicit step-by-step instructions on how to use the 
strategy, begin the training with an explanation that seeing leads to 
knowing. For example, tell children that when a person sees something 
(e.g., a marble in box) they have a thought in their head of what they saw. 
Then, introduce photographs of what the person saw to show that pictures 
can “stand in” for thoughts. Emphasize that the picture represents a 
person‟s thoughts and that it is the thought that directs the action, not the 
picture. For example, the strategy might be explained in the following 
way: When I see the ball in the garage, I make a picture in my head of the 
ball in the garage. That picture means that I think that the ball is in the 
garage. So, when I want to play with my ball, I will look for the ball in 
the garage because that is where I think it is. In using this type of 
explanation, the children learn to understand that a person‟s thoughts, 
which are taken from or represented by the pictures in their head of what 
they see, direct their behavior or actions (McGregor et al., 1998a). Repeat 
training over multiple sessions.  
 
Related References: McGregor et al., 1998a, 1998b; Swettenham et al., 
1996 
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PreK-5 
(mental age 
of at least 4 
years) 
Thought bubbles training 
 
Materials needed: paper and pencil (alternatively, thought bubbles could 
be created on the computer) 
 
In individual or very small group setting, teach students that people think 
about what they see in the world and that thought-bubbles show what a 
person is thinking. Demonstrate how to use the thought-bubbles to predict 
thoughts and behavior in various scenarios (e.g., when the environment 
changes, but the person does not see it change; when a desired object is 
secretly moved from one location to another). Provide feedback during 
the student‟s practice and training. Repeat training over multiple sessions. 
Consider tailoring the content and delivery of the instruction to the 
student‟s specific interests or strengths to enhance the learning effect 
when possible (e.g., change situational details of the false belief story to 
fit an area of interest). 
 
Related Reference: Wellman et al., 2002 
 
 
development that is supplemental to the universal strategies already in place. These types 
of strategies may be more effective and appropriate for use with students who 
demonstrate significant difficulty with ToM-related social and communication skills. 
Students with an autism spectrum disorder may display those types of deficits. Studies 
have shown that training children with autism to use physical representations such as 
pictures and thought-bubbles has promise as an effective and practical strategy to help 
them reach a higher level of ToM development. In contrast to the limited number of 
training sessions provided in these studies, educators may be able to provide intervention 
over a longer term thereby potentially increasing the positive impact on ToM 
development. Moreover, if the student is provided with special education services at 
school, the special education classroom may be a particularly good environment to 
provide this instruction as the teacher-student ratio is often lower and the student‟s  
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schedule is often more flexible. It is recommended that, prior to implementation, 
educators refer to the original training studies for specific materials and procedures (see 
McGregor et al., 1998a, 1998b, Swettenham et al., 1996, and Wellman et al., 2002). It 
also should be noted that the children who participated in these studies had a mental age 
of at least 4 years, while their chronological ages ranged from 5 to 18 years. 
Concluding Comments 
The benefits related to well-developed ToM skills are likely plentiful and wide-
ranging and will no doubt continue to emerge as this important construct is further 
researched. Nevertheless, currently, a positive connection with at least two important life 
domains, socialization and academic achievement, is clear (Astington, 1994; Klein, 1998;  
Pelletier & Astington, 2004; Razza & Blair, 2009; Wellman et al., 2001). In order for 
students to be successful at school, they must develop “a more advanced understanding of 
the mind and of how knowledge is acquired” (Homer & Tamis-LeMonda, 2005, p. 202). 
This article provided teachers with school-based ToM strategies that have the potential to 
encourage such growth and thus facilitate students‟ success in social interactions and 
academic endeavors.  
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THE EFFECTS OF A DRAMA-BASED LANGUAGE INTERVENTION ON  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY OF MIND AND EXECUTIVE  
FUNCTION IN URBAN KINDERGARTEN STUDENTS 
Over the past few decades, researchers have actively pursued a heightened 
understanding of the development of theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF). 
A strong impetus behind these efforts is the importance of these domains for children‟s 
academic and social success in school (Meltzer, 2010; Samson, 2009). The present study 
will evaluate the effectiveness of a drama-based language intervention at improving ToM 
and EF development in kindergarten students predominantly from low socioeconomic 
(SES) backgrounds. First, this article will highlight the contributions of ToM and EF to 
children‟s learning and social functioning at school. Subsequently, intervention studies 
that share common elements with the current intervention under evaluation will be 
reviewed.  
ToM involves the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others (Doherty, 
2009; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). These skills are integral to children‟s academic 
achievement in that children need adequately developed ToM to understand their 
teacher‟s intention to increase their knowledge as well as to recognize differences in their 
own and others‟ thinking and knowledge (Olson & Bruner, 1996; Ziv & Frye, 2004; Ziv, 
Solomon, & Frye, 2008). Additionally, ToM provides the foundation for metacognitive 
skill development, which allows children to think strategically about their thinking and  
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learning (Lockl & Schneider, 2006, 2007). With regard to social functioning, in order to      
experience successful social interactions and communications, it is often necessary for 
children to appreciate that others may have an interpretation of the world that is different 
from their own. An awareness and understanding of others‟ beliefs and desires helps 
children to explain and predict others‟ behavior and subsequently adjust their own 
behavior as necessary (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002; Watson, Nixon, Wilson, & 
Capage, 1999).  
EF is defined in various ways in the literature and may best be described as “an 
umbrella term for the complex cognitive processes that serve ongoing, goal-directed 
behaviors” (Meltzer, 2007, p. 1). Children‟s ability to effectively utilize these higher-
order processes, including inhibition, flexibility, attentional control, planning, 
organization, and initiation, has important implications for their learning and 
socialization. Success in academic endeavors often requires the use and coordination of 
many EF skills such as sustaining attention, organizing materials and information, using 
working memory, and planning and evaluating problem-solving approaches (Meltzer, 
2010). In terms of social interactions, EF skills are involved in the “online updating, 
evaluation, and selection of appropriate responses to a constant stream of multifaceted 
(verbal, nonverbal, contextual) information” (Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004, p.138). In 
addition, the quality of children‟s social functioning and resiliency is related to the level 
of flexible regulation and control they have over their emotions and behaviors 
(Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Morris, 2002).  
While typical development of ToM and EF prepares children to do well in school  
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and to develop socially, atypical or delayed development can hinder learning and social 
development. Poor ToM is correlated with behavior problems (e.g., Hughes & Ensor, 
2006), attention problems (e.g., McGlamery, Ball, Henley, & Besozzi, 2007), and poor 
social skills (e.g., Dunn & Cutting, 1999; Watson et al., 1999). Weaknesses in certain 
aspects of EF have been implicated in conditions that often negatively impact children‟s 
functioning at school, such as learning disabilities (e.g., Meltzer & Krishnan, 2007), 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD; e.g., Barkley, 1997), and behavior 
disorders (e.g., McCloskey, Perkins, & Van Divner, 2009).  
Additionally, research has indicated that underdeveloped ToM and EF may be 
associated with low SES (Cole & Mitchell, 1998; Hackman & Farah, 2008; Hughes & 
Ensor, 2005; Noble, Norman, & Farah, 2005). Compared to same-aged children of higher 
SES levels, children from low SES backgrounds have been found to have more difficulty 
understanding the concept of false belief (e.g., Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Cole & Mitchell, 
2000), demonstrating inhibitory control (Noble et al., 2005), and regulating attention 
(Mezzacappa, 2004). It can be difficult to explain the mechanisms that might be involved 
in this relationship because SES can be measured in different ways (e.g., parent education 
level, parent occupational status, income level, children‟s free/reduced lunch status) and 
because there are numerous factors that vary with SES level and may impact the 
relationship, including physical health, home environment, level of chronic stress, early 
education opportunities, and neighborhood characteristics (Hackman & Farah, 2008; 
Noble et al., 2005).  
Researchers have started to investigate the role of language as a potential  
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mediating factor in the relationships between SES and ToM and EF (Hughes, Jaffee, 
Happe, Taylor, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2005; Noble et al., 2005). Not only is language related 
to ToM (e.g., Jenkins & Astington, 1996) and EF (e.g., Wolfe & Bell, 2004), but 
language is also related to SES (Hoff & Tian, 2005; Noble et al., 2005; Pungello, Iruka, 
Dotterer, Mills-Koonce, & Reznick, 2009). Results of a seminal study in this area 
indicated that low SES children demonstrated significantly reduced rates of vocabulary 
growth and use at age 3 years when compared to middle and high SES children (Hart & 
Risley, 1995). With regard to ToM, Hughes and colleagues (2005) hypothesized that 
reduced levels of maternal speech may be the mechanism by which language mediates 
the impact of low SES. This hypothesis is supported by Hart and Risley‟s (1999) work, 
which revealed that low SES parents addressed half as many words to their children as 
did middle SES parents. Concerning EF, one study found that “SES does not statistically 
account for any variance in executive function ability over and above that predicted by 
language performance. Perhaps, then, SES has an effect on language, which then drives 
independently drives executive function performance” (p. 83, Noble et al., 2005).  
Thus, if the hypothesis that language mediates the relationships between SES and 
ToM and EF is accurate, it would be reasonable to assume that intervening upon 
children‟s language development may provide an opportunity to spark growth in ToM 
and EF. The current study will test this assumption by evaluating the effect of a school-
based language intervention on the development of ToM and EF in low SES urban 
kindergarten students. The specific language intervention employed in this study may be 
particularly effective because it utilizes dramatic story-telling and role-playing activities,  
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which also have been found to be related to growth in ToM (e.g., Cutting & Dunn, 2006) 
and EF (e.g., Diamond, Barnett, Thomas, & Munro, 2007).  
Intervention Studies 
This section will review studies that evaluated the effectiveness of interventions, 
trainings, or curricula implemented in the school setting that involved similar elements 
(e.g., use of mental state terms and narrative discourse, pretend or dramatic play, 
reading/telling stories, experience with self-regulatory activities/tasks) to the intervention 
under evaluation in this study. Previous efforts to facilitate ToM development in young 
children will be discussed first, followed by studies aimed at improving children‟s EF 
development.  
Several interventions have been successful at improving ToM in young children 
by engaging them, on an individual or small group basis (3 to 4 students), in narrative 
discourse with an adult about stories involving ToM-related topics (e.g., false belief, 
deception; Guajardo & Watson, 2002) and stories that contained a surprising element but 
did not explicitly reference mental states (Lu, Su, & Wang, 2008, Study 2). A practical 
limitation of these interventions, however, is the need for a low teacher/experimenter-to-
student ratio (e.g., one teacher for every three students).  
In contrast, positive results have been generated by two other interventions that, 
similar to the design of the current intervention, were implemented with larger groups of 
children (i.e., 15 or more). In one of the studies, Peskin and Astington (2004) investigated 
whether exposing children from low SES backgrounds to a significantly increased level 
of mental-state terms in story texts resulted in more improvement in ToM than exposing  
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them to mental-state concepts on an implicit level. Over the course of four weeks, 
prekindergarten teachers read two stories containing either explicit (i.e., written in the 
text) or implicit (i.e., shown in pictures) references to mental states to their classes three 
days each week. Graduate students read three books to small groups of children two days 
each week and parents read the books at home with their child. A subset of children from 
the explicit (n = 24; M age = 4 years, 5 months) and implicit (n = 24; M age = 4 years, 7 
months) classes were tested before and after the intervention. While both intervention 
conditions resulted in significant gains in ToM development, the children in the implicit 
condition, who were required to construct their own interpretation of characters‟ 
perspectives from the storylines and pictures in the books, actually significantly 
outperformed the children in the intervention group on false-belief explanation tasks. 
This finding was interpreted as consistent with Vygotsky‟s notion of scaffolding in that 
the implicit condition provided the optimal level of support for the children to actively 
construct their own inferences about the characters‟ mental states (Peskin & Astington, 
2004). The intervention under evaluation in this study encouraged children to practice a 
similar type of active construction of mentalistic interpretations when listening to and re-
telling stories and when engaging in role-play activities. 
Another whole-group ToM intervention was implemented by Dockett (1998) and 
focused on improving preschoolers‟ ToM development by enhancing the complexity of 
their pretend play. At the beginning of the three-week intervention period, a group of 
approximately 15 intervention children (M age = 4 years, 2 months) visited a pizza shop 
and observed the process of making a pizza. A special area of the preschool was set up as  
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a “pizza restaurant” with appropriate props for the intervention children to use during 
pretend play. Compared to their control counterparts, the intervention children were 
given an increased amount of time to engage in shared pretend play with each other. 
Adults monitored the play situations and facilitated more complex shared pretend play 
through guiding comments and suggestions. Results indicated that the intervention was 
successful in increasing the complexity of the intervention children‟s pretend play to a 
statistically significant level as evidenced by higher rates of imitative role play, make-
believe with objects and situations, persistence, and verbal communication (Smilansky, 
1968). Additionally, intervention children demonstrated statistically significant 
improvement on ToM tasks compared to their control counterparts. Similar role-play 
activities included in the current intervention are expected to impact ToM as well.  
With regard to EF, studies involving one-on-one training with children have 
produced significant positive results and suggest that providing children with repeated 
practice with tasks requiring response inhibition or attentional control enhances their 
development of those skills (e.g., Dowsett & Livesey, 2000). However, similar to the 
intensive ToM trainings discussed above, the need for individualized instruction reduces 
the ability for the intervention to be practically utilized in the school environment. The 
intervention activities in the current study should provide students with the opportunity to 
practice regulatory behaviors such as sustaining attention to the activity, screening out 
distractions, and controlling impulses, but on a whole group level so as to maximize the 
time and resources available for such intervention. Unfortunately, electronic search 
results in Academic Search Complete, MEDLINE, PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, and  
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Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection databases from 1900 to June 2010 did 
not yield any EF training studies at the group level involving elements comparable to the 
intervention under evaluation in the present study.  
However, some insight may be gained by a brief discussion of the Tools of the 
Mind curriculum (Bodrova & Leong, 2007) for prekindergarten students, which utilizes 
many of the same types of activities as the present intervention yet is implemented on a 
daily basis over the course of an entire school year. The Tools of the Mind (Tools) 
curriculum is based on Vygotsky‟s work and focuses on the role of self-regulation (i.e., 
ability to attend, solve problems, plan, and remember) in learning and academic 
achievement. In this program, teachers facilitate growth in children‟s self-regulation by 
helping them increase the maturity and complexity of their dramatic play. From the 
perspective of Tools, dramatic play is believed to be an effective mechanism for the 
development of self-regulation because “dramatic play leads to the internalization of 
rules and expectations and places demands and constraints on a child‟s behavior” 
(Barnett et al., 2008, p. 302). In one evaluative study that examined the impact of Tools 
on low SES prekindergarten students, Tools was found to produce statistically significant 
improvement in children‟s self-control (i.e., inhibition), memory, and cognitive flexibility 
over the traditional literacy curriculum (Diamond, Barnett, Thomas, & Munro, 2007). 
These results lend strong support to the hypothesis that the dramatic role-play component 
of the intervention under evaluation in the present study will engender growth in EF skills 
related to self-regulation, such as inhibition and sustained attention. In order to maintain 
their role, children must sustain attention to the play interaction and inhibit behaviors that  
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would be inconsistent with that character or situation. Additionally, the role play element 
of the current intervention is hypothesized to impact children‟s ToM development as role 
play encourages children to experience the perspective, language, and emotions of 
different characters and situations.  
Rationale 
The particular intervention evaluated in this study is hypothesized to engender 
growth in ToM because it incorporates many elements found to be associated with ToM 
development, such as experience with language (e.g., Jenkins & Astington, 1996), mental 
state talk (e.g., Adrian, Clemente, & Villanueva, 2007), pretend play (e.g., Cutting & 
Dunn, 2006), and story recall (e.g., Lu et al., 2008, Study 1). Researchers also have found 
a relationship between language and EF (Hughes, 1998; Wolfe & Bell, 2004); therefore, 
the impact on EF development is expected to be engendered by the language component 
of the intervention. In particular, the intervention is hypothesized to improve two specific 
EF skills (i.e., inhibition, attentional control) due to children‟s participation in 
intervention activities (e.g., role play) that require sustained, active engagement and use 
of motor and cognitive self-control. 
Most of the previous intervention studies have been conducted in preschool 
environments (e.g., Peskin & Astington, 2004) and have focused on either ToM or EF. 
This study offers a unique contribution to the literature by evaluating an intervention 
program that is implemented in the elementary school setting and may impact multiple 
skill domains. Additionally, the intervention is delivered in a whole-group format and 
thus may enhance our ability to impact a greater number of students in need compared to  
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individualized or small-group interventions. The main aim of this study is to determine 
whether there were significant differences in children‟s development of ToM and EF, 
namely inhibitory and attentional control skills, following participation in a drama-based 
language arts intervention compared to traditional language arts instruction. The 
children‟s performance on tasks measuring these skills was compared after controlling 
for pre-intervention functioning.  
Method 
Context and Participants  
Six public elementary schools in a large metropolitan school system in the 
Southeast were recruited to participate in a three-year intervention study. These schools 
were identified as having the highest rates of children receiving free and reduced lunch in 
the county. Three schools were randomly assigned to receive the intervention services 
and three schools were randomly assigned to serve as waiting controls (e.g., Year 1 
control schools received intervention services in Year 2). All kindergarten students 
enrolled at the intervention schools received the intervention services, but only a 
subsample of the students were randomly selected to participate in data collection. Data 
from the three-year study indicated that the language skills of these students were 
generally within the lower end of the average range for their age. A waiver of consent 
was granted from the university‟s Institutional Review Board (IRB).  
Using a computer-generated list of random numbers, a sample of 80 students (40 
intervention; 40 control) were randomly selected from the intervention and control 
schools to participate in this study. A total of 7 students (3 intervention; 4 control)  
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withdrew from their respective schools before pre-testing started. New participants were 
randomly selected from the remaining pool of students to compensate for these losses and 
protect against further attrition during post-testing (13 intervention; 11 control). An 
additional 14 students (9 intervention; 5 control) withdrew from their respective schools 
before post-testing began. A series of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) indicated 
no significant differences between students who withdrew after pre-testing and those who 
participated in both pre- and post-testing.  
The final sample consisted of 83 students in total (42% male; 94% African 
American), with 41 students in the intervention group (41% male; 100% African 
American) and 42 students in the control group (43% male; 88% African American). At 
pre-test, the average age of the full sample was 68.4 months (SD = 3.82). At post-test, the 
average age of the full sample was 72.8 months (SD = 3.79). The students‟ eligibility for 
free- or reduced-price lunch was provided to the researchers via school records and used 
as an indicator of their SES level. Data was unavailable for 42% of intervention 
participants and 33% of control participants. However, general school data indicated that, 
on average, 87% of the student populations of the participating schools were eligible for 
free- or reduced-price lunch. Thus, it is likely that the majority of the students 
participating in this study would have this eligibility and be considered of low 
socioeconomic status. Of the participating students with intact data (24 intervention 
students; 28 control students), 81% received free or reduced price lunch (71% of 
intervention group; 89% of control group).  
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Georgia Wolf Trap Program 
 “The Wolf Trap Early Learning Program,” from here forward called the Georgia 
Wolf Trap (GWT) program, is a drama-based language intervention developed and 
implemented by Georgia Wolf Trap/Alliance Theatre Institute for Educators to address 
the needs of students from disadvantaged backgrounds who are often at-risk for academic 
failure due to limited language development. The GWT program provides arts-integrated 
learning experiences for students aged 3 – 5 years through a drama-based language arts 
curriculum. This program is intended to produce significant improvements in language 
skills (both oral and written) and in understanding of emotional expressions as well as 
introduce children to drama and theatre. The GWT program is in line with recent 
guidelines for developmentally appropriate practices in early literacy education created 
by the National Association for the Education of Young Children and the International 
Reading Association. Additionally, the intervention is connected to the state curriculum 
standards.  
Each year, a research team from a nearby university conducted an independent 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the GWT program by pre- and post-testing a subsample 
of the participating kindergarten students using measures of expressive and receptive 
language, emotional understanding, academic achievement, and drama achievement. 
Empirical studies have indicated that the GWT program produces significant growth in 
emergent writing (Kruger, Flanigan, Kapsch, Samuelson, & Harris, 2003) and emotion 
understanding (Kruger, Kapsch, Samuelson, & Harris, 2005). In Year 3, additional data 
was collected to investigate whether the GWT program also impacted ToM and EF. This  
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article describes the results of that additional data analysis. University institutional review 
board (IRB) approval was granted for data collection and analysis.  
Intervention and Control Conditions 
From February to April 2008, students in the intervention classrooms received 13 
lessons designed to enhance children‟s understanding and use of symbols by exploring 
literature through imaginative role-play. The 45-50 minute intervention lessons were 
provided by teaching artists from a local professional theatre company who were trained 
to deliver educational programs to children in schools. The lessons took the place of the 
students‟ typical instruction in language arts. Specific skills targeted by the intervention 
lessons included vocabulary development, story-telling and re-telling, exploration of 
character, discovery of meaning, and use and understanding of emotional expression. At 
the beginning of the intervention period, children in the intervention group attended a 
professional production of a play based on a children‟s book. During the subsequent 
intervention lessons in the kindergarten classrooms, the teaching artist (and, at times, the 
classroom teacher) read the children‟s book again and led the participating students 
through a range of activities to create new versions of the story through drama. These 
activities involved elaborating on the story themes, creating new characters and plots, and 
role-playing.  
Students in the control classrooms received standard direct instruction in language 
arts as prescribed by the state curriculum. Kindergarten standards include recognizing all 
letters of the alphabet, applying phonics skills to reading, acquiring and using grade-level 
words to communicate effectively, demonstrating comprehension of orally presented text,  
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beginning to write in a variety of genres (e.g., narrative, information, persuasive), and 
using oral and visual skills to communicate.   
Measures 
The NEPSY-Second Edition (NEPSY-II; Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 2007) is a 
standardized and norm-referenced instrument designed to assess neuropsychological 
development across a range of skills in children aged 3 to 16 years. As indicated in the 
manual, validity studies with clinical and non-clinical populations provided evidence for 
content, concurrent, and construct validity. Recent test reviews of the NEPSY-II 
indicated that the evidence for construct and concurrent validity is generally strong 
(Brooks, Sherman, & Strauss, 2010; D‟Amato, Titley, & Napolitano, 2010; Davis & 
Matthews, 2010). Selected subtests from the NEPSY-II were administered to evaluate 
ToM and EF (inhibition and attentional control, in particular). Subtest scaled scores have 
a mean of 10 and standard deviation of 3. 
ToM. The Theory of Mind subtest was used to examine the ability to understand 
others‟ mental states and perspectives. This subtest is appropriate for children aged 3 to 
16 years and is comprised of two major sections. In the Verbal portion of the subtest, the 
child is presented with scenarios or shown pictures and is then asked questions that 
require knowledge of another individual‟s point of view to answer correctly. These items 
assess the child‟s “ability to understand mental functions such as belief, intention, 
deception, emotion, imagination, and pretending, as well as the ability to understand that 
others have their own thoughts, ideas, and feelings that may be different from one‟s own” 
(Korkman et al., 2007, p. 15). The Verbal portion of the subtest contains 15 items. A  
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child can earn one point for a correct response on nine of the items, up to two points for a 
correct response on five of the items, and up to three points for one of the items 
(maximum of 22 total points). Items on the Verbal portion of the subtest measure the 
following concepts and skills: seeing leads to knowing, false belief, recognizing mental 
states, imitation/pretending, mental-physical distinction, bluff, double bluff, appearance-
reality, and understanding figurative language. The Contextual portion of the subtest uses 
pictures depicting social contexts to evaluate the student‟s ability to relate emotion to 
social situations. For each of the six items in the Contextual task, the student is asked to 
select (by pointing) one photograph from four options that shows the appropriate affect of 
the target person in the picture. The student is awarded one point for a correct response. 
The points received for correct responses on the Verbal and Contextual portions of the 
Theory of Mind subtest are summed to generate a Theory of Mind Total Score (TM 
Total) ranging from 0 to 28 points. The reliability coefficient for children aged 5-6 years 
is .84 for TM Total. 
Inhibition. Participants‟ ability to inhibit dominant responses and produce new, 
incompatible responses was assessed by the Inhibition subtest. This subtest is appropriate 
for children aged 5 to 16 years. In this subtest, the child is presented with five rows of 
eight black and white shapes (circles and squares) or arrows (facing up and down) and is 
instructed to name either the shape or direction (Naming trials) or an alternate response 
(Inhibition trials). While the children participated in the Naming trials as well, only their 
performance on the Inhibition trials was analyzed as these are the scores that are 
indicative of inhibitory control. In the Inhibition trials, the child is asked to suppress the  
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correct response and provide an alternate response. For example, in the first trial, the 
child is instructed to call a square a “circle,” and a circle a “square.” In the second trial, 
the child should say “up” if the arrow points down and vice versa. For each Inhibition 
trial (shapes and arrows), the student receives a score for the total amount of time elapsed 
from the first to the last item on the page and the total number of errors. These scores are 
summed across the two trials to generate two raw scores for the Inhibition condition of 
this subtest: Inhibition Total Completion Time (in seconds; INI Total Time) and 
Inhibition Total Errors (INI Total Errors). The reliability coefficients for children aged 5-
6 years are .64 for INI Total Time, and .74 for INI Total Errors.  
Attentional Control. The Auditory Attention subtest was used to assess the 
ability to focus attention in the face of distracting or competing stimuli (selective 
attention) and the ability to stay focused on a task for a continuous period of time 
(sustained attention). This subtest uses an auditory continuous performance paradigm and 
is appropriate for children aged 5 to 16 years. For three minutes, the child is instructed to 
listen to a series of words presented through an audio CD (e.g., box, thing, put, red, now, 
yellow) and touch the red circle on the accompanying stimulus page (containing four 
colored circles: black, yellow, blue, red) when he or she hears the target word, “red”. The 
target word is presented 30 times during the 3-minute task and the child is awarded one 
point each time he or she appropriately touches the red circle within two seconds of 
hearing the target word. Thus, the maximum raw score for this subtest is 30. The 
reliability coefficient for children aged 5-6 years is .74 for Auditory Attention Total 
Correct (AA Total). 
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Procedure 
The primary author conducted the majority of the pre- and post-testing. On a few 
occasions, one of two additional examiners assisted with subtest administration. These 
examiners were graduate students who were completing doctoral degrees in a School 
Psychology and had prior training and experience with assessment of children. The 
superintendent of the school system as well as the principals of the participating schools 
granted permission to test students in their schools during the school day. Each student 
participated in one individual testing session lasting approximately 30 minutes before and 
after the intervention time period. The EF and ToM tasks (NEPSY-II subtests) were 
administered in one of three fixed orders, which were counterbalanced across 
participants. The three fixed orders of presentation were: (1) Auditory Attention – 
Inhibition – Theory of Mind; (2) Inhibition – Theory of Mind – Auditory Attention; and, 
(3) Theory of Mind – Auditory Attention – Inhibition. At post-testing, each participant 
was administered the subtests in the same order in which they were presented during pre-
testing in order to control for test order effects.  
Pre-testing was conducted from November 2007 to January 2008. The 13 
intervention lessons were delivered from February to April 2008. Post-testing was 
conducted in April and May 2008. On average, 4 months and 15 days elapsed between 
pre- and post-testing (with a range of 3 months, 14 days to 5 months, 10 days).  
Data Analysis 
 
Ninety-nine percent of participants successfully completed all three NEPSY-II 
subtests administered during pre- and post-testing. One control participant was unable to  
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complete the Inhibition subtest at pre- and post-testing. Rather than remove this 
participant‟s scores from all data analyses, the mean raw scores earned by the control 
group for INI Total Time and INI Total Errors were applied to the missing data 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). SPSS Version 14 for Windows was used to run statistical 
analyses.  
Results 
This section begins with a review of preliminary analyses conducted to evaluate 
the equivalence of the intervention and control groups at pre-test. Subsequently, 
exploratory analyses of the data will be presented. Pre-test raw scores were converted 
into scaled scores to determine how the intervention and control students‟ performance 
compared the NEPSY-II standardization sample. Paired-sample t tests were conducted to 
examine the changes of ToM and EF from pre-test to post-test in the intervention and 
control groups. Additionally, Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted to 
ascertain relationships between pre- and post-test scores on the dependent variables (TM 
Total, INI Total Time, INI Total Errors, and AA Total) in the full sample. Finally, the 
results of tests assessing the effects of the intervention will be discussed. An individual 
one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to examine the effects of the 
intervention on each of the dependent variables. The Holms‟ procedure was utilized to 
control for the effect of multiple testing in each set of analyses.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Table 5 shows the pre-test means and standard deviations of all dependent 
variables for the intervention and control groups. A series of one-way analyses of  
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variance (ANOVAs) were performed to test for differences between the groups in age, 
gender, socioeconomic status, and pre-test scores. There was no significant difference 
between the intervention and control groups in any of these variables: age at pre-test, F(1, 
81) = 1.30, p = .258; gender, F(1, 81) = .016, p = .899; socioeconomic status, F(1, 81) = 
1.51, p = .222; TM Total pre-test, F(1, 81) = 2.76, p = .101; INI Total Time pre-test, F(1, 
81) = .385, p = .537; INI Total Errors pre-test, F(1, 81) = .03, p = .863; AA Total pre-test, 
F(1, 81) = .039, p = .844.  
Exploratory Analyses 
 When compared to NEPSY-II normative data, the mean pre-test raw scores of the 
full sample corresponded to scaled scores falling within the average range of functioning 
for their age (scaled scores within the range of 8 to 12). Additionally, the normative 
performance of the full sample was examined on a case-by-case basis. In a normal 
distribution, 68% of scores fall within the average range and 32% of scores fall above and 
below the average range (16% below average; 16% above average). In the current study, 
the scores of the full sample were not normally distributed. For TM Total, 59% of pre-
test scores fell in the average range, 40% fell in the below average range, and 1% fell in 
the above average range. For INI Total Time, 72% of pre-test scores fell in the average 
range, 18% fell in the below average range, and 10% fell in the above average range. For 
INI Total Errors, 55% of pre-test scores fell in the average range, 33% fell in the below 
average range, and 12% fell in the above average range. Finally, for AA Total, 60% of 
pre-test scores fell in the average range, 17% in the below average range, and 23% in the 
above average range. While the percentages of below average performance for INI Total  
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Time and AA Total were within the range expected based on the standard normal 
distribution (16%), the percentages for TM Total and INI Total Errors indicated that more 
students than would be expected were functioning below the average range for their age 
at pre-test. Additionally, a higher proportion of the sample than would be expected 
demonstrated above average performance on the Auditory Attention subtest (AA Total).  
Means and standard deviations of all dependent variables for the intervention and 
control groups at pre- and post-test along with mean differences from pre- to post-test are 
shown in Table 5. Paired-sample t tests of each dependent variable were conducted 
separately for the intervention and control groups to assess improvement from pre-test to 
post-test. Effect sizes were calculated using Cohen‟s (1988) effect size formula (d), 
where an effect size of .20 is considered small, an effect of .50 is considered medium, and 
an effect of .80 is considered large. All pre-post comparisons were significant in the 
intervention group as well as the control group. In the intervention group, significant 
improvement was observed in TM Total, t(42) = -5.43, p < .001, d = .68, AA Total, t(42) 
= -4.99, p < .001, d = .72, INI Total Time, t(42) = 4.40, p < .001, d = .70, and INI Total 
Errors, t(42) = 4.82, p < .001, d = .74. Similarly, children in the control group 
significantly improved their TM Total, t(41) = -6.01, p < .001, d = .72, AA Total, t(41) = 
-3.60, p = .001, d = .54, INI Total Time, t(41) = 4.19, p < .001, d = .67, and INI Total 
Errors, t(41) = 4.45, p < .001, d = .71. Effect sizes were comparable between intervention 
and control groups for pre-to-post-test improvement on TM Total, INI Total Time, and 
INI Total Errors. In contrast, a notable difference in effect size occurred between the 
intervention and control groups on improvement in AA Total scores. While a medium to  
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large difference was observed for the intervention group‟s pre-post performance, the 
control group‟s growth from pre-test to post-test was consistent with a medium effect 
size.  
 Associations between the dependent variables at pre- and post-test for the full 
sample (n = 83) were assessed by conducting Pearson‟s product-moment correlations. 
Significant correlations were found between the pre- and post-test scores on each 
dependent variable (see Table 6). Additionally, post-test AA Total was significantly 
related to pre-test TM Total and post-test INI Total Errors. Finally, post-test INI Total 
Time was significantly correlated with pre- and post-test INI Total Errors.  
Effect of Intervention 
Preliminary analyses evaluating the homogeneity-of-regression (slopes) 
assumption indicated that the relationship between the covariates (pre-tests) and the 
dependent variables (post-tests) did not differ significantly as a function of group status: 
TM Total, F(1, 79) = .798, p = .374; INI Total Time, F(1, 79) = .265, p = .608; INI Total 
Errors, F(1, 79) = .148, p = .702; AA Total, F(1, 79) = .784, p = .378. Adjusted post-test 
mean scores for all dependent variables are presented in Table 3. More detailed results of 
each individual ANCOVA are presented in Tables 7 through 11.  
Theory of mind. In order to examine the effects of the intervention on theory of 
mind, a one-way ANCOVA was conducted for post-test TM Total. Pre-test TM Total 
was entered as the covariate. The ANCOVA was not significant, F(1, 80) = .035, p = 
.853.  
 
Table 6          80 
 
Pearson Correlations of Performance on ToM and EF Tasks at Pre-test and Post-test 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Pre-test TM total ---        
2. Post-test TM total .697* ---       
3. Pre-test INI total 
time 
-.189 -.211 ---      
4. Post-test INI total 
time 
-.302 -.275 .477* ---     
5. Pre-test INI total 
errors 
-.319 -.170 -.040 .332* ---    
6. Post-test INI total 
errors 
-.295 -.188 -.021 .417* .514* ---   
7. Pre-test AA total .312 .256 -.240 -.247 -.232 -.246 ---  
8. Post-test AA total .363* .264 -.108 -.257 -.282 -.337* .565* --- 
 
* Indicates significance at the .05 level after controlling for the effects of multiple testing.  
 
 
Table 7 
 
Analysis of Covariance Adjusted Mean Scores by Group 
 
Variable Intervention 
(n = 41) 
Control 
(n = 42) 
p Partial eta 
squared 
 
TM total 
(# correct out of 28) 
14.717 14.586 .853 .000 
INI total time 
(in seconds) 
123.172 122.761 .938 .000 
INI total errors 
 
10.716 12.301 .313 .013 
AA total 
(# correct out of 30) 25.520 24.421 .185 .022 
Table 8          81 
 
Analysis of Covariance Summary for Auditory Attention 
 
Source DF Sum of  
Squares 
Mean  
Square 
   F 
Value 
   P  
Value 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Pre Test 1 541.093 541.093 38.664 .000 .326 
Group 1 25.051 25.051 1.790 .185 .022 
Error 80 1119.579 13.995    
 
 
 
Table 9 
 
Analysis of Covariance Summary for Inhibition Total Errors 
 
Source DF Sum of  
Squares 
Mean  
Square 
   F  
Value 
   P  
Value 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Pre Test 1 1464.370 1464.370 28.933 .000 .266 
Group 1 52.081 52.081 1.029 .313 .013 
Error 80 4049.047 50.613    
 
 
 
Table 10 
 
Analysis of Covariance Summary for Inhibition Total Time 
 
Source DF Sum of  
Squares 
Mean  
Square 
   F  
Value 
   P  
Value 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Pre Test 1 13129.924 13129.924 23.347 .000 .226 
Group 1 3.479 3.479 .006 .938 .000 
Error 80 44989.598 562.370    
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Analysis of Covariance Summary for Theory of Mind 
 
Source DF Sum of  
Squares 
Mean  
Square 
   F  
Value 
   P  
Value 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Pre Test 1 724.088 724.088 72.602 .000 .476 
Group 1 .345 .345 .035 .853 .000 
Error 80 797.866 9.973    
 
 
Inhibition. In order to examine the effects of the intervention on inhibition, 
separate one-way ANCOVAs were conducted for post-test INI Total Time and post-test 
INI Total Errors. Pre-test INI Total Time and pre-test INI Total Errors were entered as 
the covariate, respectively. The ANCOVAs were not significant, INI Total Time, F(1, 
80) = .006, p = .938; INI Total Errors, F(1, 80) = 1.03, p = .313. 
Attentional control. In order to examine the effects of the intervention on 
attentional control, a one-way ANCOVA was conducted for post-test AA Total. Pre-test 
AA Total was entered as the covariate. The ANCOVA was not significant, F(1, 80) = 
1.79, p = .185. 
Discussion 
 
 The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the GWT program 
at improving ToM and EF in a sample of urban kindergarten students primarily from low 
SES backgrounds. This drama-based language intervention was hypothesized to impact 
these skills because it incorporated many of the elements identified by previous research 
(e.g., Cutting & Dunn, 2006; Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Wolfe & Bell, 2004) as 
associated with the development of ToM and EF skills. Unfortunately, the results 
indicated that, after taking pre-test scores into consideration, post-test scores between the  
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two groups were not significantly different. Although a positive trend was observed for 
the intervention group to perform better on ToM and EF tasks than the control group 
(based on the fact that the adjusted post-test means for the intervention group were 
generally better than the control group), the difference was not statistically significant.  
These results suggested that the growth observed in ToM and EF, as measured by the 
NEPSY-II tasks, may be due to maturation.  
The findings in this study were in contrast to previous studies (e.g., Dockett, 1998; 
Diamond et al., 2007) that have found significant effects on ToM and EF development 
with interventions comprised of components similar to the GWT program. For example, 
Dockett‟s (1998) pretend play intervention was found to significantly improve preschool 
children‟s performance on ToM tasks. Additionally, an intervention that exposed children 
to stories involving high levels of explicit or implicit mental state information resulted in 
significantly improved ability to understand and explain false beliefs (Peskin & 
Astington, 2004). Although the GWT intervention contained similar role-play and story-
telling elements, there were three notable differences between the current and former 
studies that may explain the inconsistent findings.  
One difference was the age range of the samples, with the current study using 
kindergarten students (M age = 5 years, 8 months) and the previous studies using 
preschool-aged children (4 years, 5 months old on average; Docket, 1998; Peskin & 
Astington, 2004). ToM has been found to undergo significant growth during early 
childhood years, with the hallmark of ToM, false belief understanding, often achieved 
around 4 years of age (Wellman et al., 2001). It is possible that the younger children in  
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the previous studies were in a sensitive period of ToM development and thus may have 
been able to benefit more from the interventions. Given their advanced age, the current 
sample of kindergarten students may have moved beyond that sensitive period or may 
have already mastered early ToM milestones addressed by the GWT program. The fact 
that the overall sample‟s average pre-test score on the Theory of Mind subtest was 
consistent with the average range for their age supported this explanation. There will be 
further discussion of this particular result at a later point in this section.   
Another difference between the current investigation and the previous studies 
(Dockett, 1998; Peskin & Astington, 2004) was the type of measures used to assess ToM. 
Both Dockett (1998) and Peskin and Astington (2004) utilized experimental tasks to 
assess growth in discrete ToM skills, such as false belief understanding or appearance-
reality distinction. In contrast, the current study utilized the Theory of Mind subtest from 
the NEPSY-II, which has the benefit of being a standardized, norm-referenced test with 
strong psychometric properties. A possible disadvantage of using a measure like the 
Theory of Mind subtest on the NEPSY-II is that it assessed a much wider range of ToM 
skills, which may have masked our ability to detect the growth in specific ToM skills 
(e.g., false belief) that may have occurred as a result of participation in the GWT 
program. It would be interesting for future research to further explore this methodological 
issue, possibly by comparing the sensitivity of the NEPSY-II to the precision of 
experimental tasks in detecting growth within a single sample of children. Additionally, 
future endeavors may wish to investigate the utility of other standardized, norm-
referenced measures of ToM and EF for pre-post comparisons.  
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Finally, a difference observed between the current study and the work of Peskin and 
Astington (2004) was that of parent involvement. In Peskin and Astington‟s (2004) study, 
children were exposed to story books containing mental-state information five days a 
week at school and at least four to six times per week at home. In contrast, the 
intervention in the current study did not involve parents and was implemented solely 
during the school day. The added “intervention” time provided by the parents in Peskin 
and Astington‟s (2004) study may have substantially elevated the intensity, and thus 
effectiveness, of the four-week long mental-state book reading intervention. Future 
research may wish to confirm the degree to which parent involvement contributed to the 
impact of the intervention on ToM development in Peskin and Astington‟s (2004) study.  
 With regard to EF, the emphasis on dramatic role play was previously noted as a 
common intervention component shared by the GWT program and the Tools (Bodrova & 
Leong, 2007) curriculum. While a recent evaluation revealed that Tools had a significant 
impact on EF development in low SES preschool children (Diamond et al., 2007), the 
results of the current study did not demonstrate a significant impact on EF development. 
A possible reason for these discrepant findings is the vastly different level of intervention 
intensity. As mentioned earlier, Tools is a curriculum that is implemented on a daily basis 
over the course of a full academic year. In contrast, the GWT intervention was delivered 
in 13 45-minute lessons. It is possible that the GWT program was not of sufficient 
duration and frequency to effect substantial growth in inhibitory or attentional control 
skills. Future endeavors should investigate the specific levels of intervention frequency  
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and duration necessary to produce growth in ToM and EF, yet remain practical for 
school-based provision. 
It is of note, however, that while the GWT program was not found to bring about 
statistically significant improvement in attentional control, it did produce a larger effect 
size than the growth observed as a result of standard language arts instruction. That is, the 
intervention group improved almost three-quarters of a standard deviation from pre- to 
post-test, while the control group improved about one-half of a standard deviation. While 
this difference was not statistically significant, it may have a practical impact in the 
classroom with regard to how well these children are able to regulate their attention to a 
task. Although observational measures (e.g., teacher rating scales, direct behavior 
observation techniques) of children‟s attentional control in the classroom environment 
were not included in the current study, future investigations may do well to incorporate 
such a measure in order to address the practical significance of children‟s performance on 
experimental tasks. As children‟s ability to regulate their attention has been found to 
relate significantly to their academic achievement (Polderman, Boomsma, Bartels, 
Verhulst, & Huizink, 2010), an important measure of “significance” may in fact be 
observational in nature.  
 The results of the exploratory correlational analyses in the current study generate 
some interesting discussion points. While no a priori hypotheses were stated regarding 
expected relationships between ToM and EF, the general finding of previous research 
would lead us to assume that significant correlations between ToM (TM Total) and 
inhibition (specifically, INI Total Errors) would occur at, and possibly between, pre- and  
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post-test time points. These “expected” results did not occur in the current sample of 
students. However, an important distinction between the present study and most previous 
investigations is, again, the age-range of the participating children. Much of the prior 
research that found significant correlations between ToM and inhibition was conducted 
with children of a younger age than the current sample (e.g., Hughes & Ensor, 2005). It 
may be that the degree of association may vary over the course of natural development as 
well as in response to different types and levels of environmental input present at 
different ages. A study by Hughes and Ensor (2007) provided some support for this idea 
and suggested that the relationships between ToM and inhibition may diminish, or 
become more variable, over time. In their study, children (n = 124) were administered 
sets of ToM and EF tasks at three different time points, beginning when the children were 
2 years of age. Correlational analyses indicated statistically significant relationships 
between aggregate measures of ToM and EF (including inhibition) of .44 and .46 at age 2 
and 3, respectively. Interestingly, while it remained statistically significant, the ToM-EF 
relationship weakened to .28 at age 4. In addition to the possible impact of developmental 
differences on the ToM-EF relationship, the association between ToM and inhibitory 
skills at both time points in this study may have been impacted by the disproportionate 
number of students who had earned below average pre-test scores on the Theory of Mind 
subtest and on the number of errors on the Inhibition subtest.  
This comment regarding the pre-intervention functioning of the current sample in 
ToM and EF leads to the final discussion point in this article. As noted in the introductory 
section of this article, previous research has indicated that low SES children tend to  
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demonstrate underdeveloped ToM and EF (e.g., Hughes & Ensor, 2005; Noble et al., 
2005). In contrast to previous research, the pre-intervention mean raw scores of the full 
sample of low SES children in the current study were found to be within the average 
range when converted to scaled scores, which indicated age-appropriate functioning in 
ToM and EF. When the data was examined more closely, it was determined that there 
were more children performing in the below average range prior to the intervention on 
the Theory of Mind subtest and the Inhibition subtest (number of errors, specifically) than 
would be expected based on a normal distribution of scores. However, the greatest 
proportion of this sample‟s pre-test scaled scores fell within the average range for each of 
the four dependent measures. Additionally, a higher percentage of students demonstrated 
above average performance on the Auditory Attention subtest than would be expected. 
Therefore, the results of this study suggested that it may be inaccurate to characterize 
children from low SES backgrounds as demonstrating weak, or below average, ToM and 
EF performance. It may be valuable for future research to seek out larger sample sizes so 
that these patterns could be more definitively examined and understood.  
Concluding Comments 
This study contributes to the literature by painting a different picture of the 
development of ToM and EF in children from low SES backgrounds. The results of this 
study suggested that children from low SES backgrounds may demonstrate a wider range 
of ability in these skill domains than previous research has identified.  In contrast to the 
overwhelmingly subaverage ToM (e.g., Cole & Mitchell, 2000) and EF (Noble et al., 
2005) skills found in prior studies, the majority of the current sample of low SES  
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kindergarten children entered the study with age-appropriate performance on ToM and 
EF tasks, and significant change due to the drama-based language intervention was not 
captured statistically. Still, a greater proportion of these students demonstrated 
subaverage performance than would be expected; thus, this group of children remains an 
important target group for future research and intervention. As has been discussed, well-
developed ToM and EF skills are associated with success in school, both academically 
and socially. In order to ensure the success of all students, investigation of ToM and EF, 
especially in terms of methods to foster these skills in the natural environment, continues 
to be a necessary and worthwhile endeavor.  
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APPENDIXES 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Example of Perspective-Shifting Discourse about Deceptive Objects 
 
Sarah, what do you think this is? (An apple.) You think that it is an apple. I think that it 
looks like an apple, too. Bobby, what do you think this is? (It looks like a real apple, but 
it also looks like a fake apple.) Let‟s look at it more closely. Here, Sarah, you hold it for a 
minute. What do you think it is now, Sarah? (It‟s a candle!) Right, at first you thought it 
was an apple, but now know it is a candle. When you first saw it, what did you first think 
it was? (An apple.) Right, at first you thought it was an apple. It looks like an apple, so 
you thought it was an apple. But what is it really and truly? (A candle.) Exactly. Really it 
is a candle. 
 
Example of Elaborative Mental State Talk (Peterson & Slaughter, 2003, p. 427) 
 
SCENARIO: Mum and Joshua, age 4, are visiting Grandpa in his high-rise unit. While 
they are there, he receives a parcel in the mail and opens it. It is a card from an old friend 
enclosing a packet of seeds. Grandpa sighs and looks unhappy. On the way home, Joshua 
asks Mum why Grandpa was sad when he got such a nice present of flower seeds. Mum 
says: 
 
RESPONSE: “It is hard to know what someone else is thinking. Even though Grandpa is 
my Dad, I do not always know what thoughts are in his mind. But sometimes I can guess 
his thoughts. I think maybe he was sad to get seeds because they reminded him of his 
garden at the home before he moved into the unit, and he misses it.” 
 
Example of Elaborative Mental State Talk (Peterson & Slaughter, 2003, p. 426) 
 
SCENARIO: Mum is collecting Kevin, age 4, from preschool, and meets a friend at the 
gate. They are conversing when Kevin comes up. So Mum does not notice that Kevin has 
slipped his empty flask into her things, sliding it under the cover of her shopping bask. 
The friend leaves, and Mum says to Kevin, “Quick run back into your classroom and get 
your flask: You forgot to bring it!” Kevin looks a little puzzled, but hurries obediently 
back inside. Then Mum opens her basket and sees the flask. She goes in and collects 
Kevin, saying: 
 
RESPONSE: “Come on Kevin. I am sorry I sent you back for your flask. It was my 
mistake. I wasn‟t paying attention when you came out, so I didn‟t see you put the flask in 
my basket. Because I hadn‟t seen it, I did not know it was there. But it was, and I should 
have looked. Even grown-ups‟ minds get mixed up sometimes! Let‟s go home.” 
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